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Abstract 
This study was set out to understand why some African countries succeed in implementing 
co-management programmes in natural resource management while others fail to do so. This 
relevant problem is at the center of this thesis and was examined in a comparative empirical 
investigation of Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) in Botswana 
and Zambia. The findings of this study demonstrate that even though Botswana and Zambia 
developed similar policies and legislations and understanding of the core foundations of 
CBNRM, the two countries have taken different trajectories in the development and 
implementation of CBNRM. The study also shows that the success of CBNRM in Botswana 
has been realized through effective cooperative efforts by the government and the local 
communities residing in controlled hunting areas. The case of Botswana proves the fact that 
when the local people are given appropriate incentives, authority and ownership over land and 
wildlife resources, they could effectively organize themselves in managing and preserving 
wildlife resources. On the other hand, this study has shown why Zambia has been less 
successful when compared to Botswana in co-management programmes. CBNRM in Zambia 
has been less successful because there is lack of political will to decentralize decision making 
authority and responsibilities over wildlife management to the local communities. 
Additionally, less attention has been paid to the development of effective local institutions 
and formulation of legislations and policies that support local community ownership of 
natural resources. 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND  
How can we understand why some African countries succeed in implementing co-
management programmes in natural resource management while others fail to do so? This 
relevant problem is at the center of this thesis and will be examined in an empirical 
investigation. This chapter gives a background of the problem and formulates the aim for this 
thesis as well as a number of precise research questions. It concludes by outlining the 
structure of this thesis.  
Beginning in the early 1980s and 1990s natural resource policies for conservation in Southern 
Africa started receiving criticism for centralizing power and responsibility to manage, protect 
and conserve natural resources in the bureaucratic state institutions. In most African countries, 
the increasing threat   to biodiversity loss particularly through overexploitation of wildlife in 
the 1970s and 1980s exposed the failure and inefficiency of several state institutions 
particularly wildlife departments in managing and protecting wildlife and their habitat. State 
institution charged with the responsibility to manage wildlife resources relied heavily on a 
top-down or centralized approach to wildlife management and conservation (Gibbson and 
Agrawal, 1999). This approach previously known as the Fortress Model of Conservation 
resulted in the exclusion of the local communities from the resources they had previously 
owned and relied on for their livelihood (Terborgh, 1999; Songorwa, 1999). This also made 
the management and protection of wildlife in areas outside designated protected areas and on 
private land difficult (Hulme and Murphree, 2001).Thus the continuation of the same colonial 
policies for conservation by the post-colonial African states took away the ownership rights 
that the local communities previously had over natural resources. 
Furthermore, the exclusion of local people through these state policies based on the creation 
of protected areas, game reserves and national game parks has been challenged for failure to 
recognize and acknowledge the costs suffered by communities through loss of life, crops and 
property damage due to wildlife encroachment on their farm land. These policies also meant 
that the local communities were no longer able to access benefits from natural resources such 
as wildlife which previously belonged to them before the advent of western colonialism. 
Many critics of the fortress approach to natural resources conservation have argued that this 
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approach had collapsed into open access regimes which contributed to the overexploitation of 
natural resources particularly wildlife (Ibid). 
The failure of the centralized approach to natural resource management and conservation gave 
rise to emergence Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) in Southern 
African countries. CBNRM was adopted in Southern Africa as an alternative approach and 
strategy to natural resource management and conservation. This approach inherently 
embraced the key principle and ethics of sustainable development which included the need to 
maintain a balance between economic development goals and natural resource conservation 
by taking into account the social and economic needs of the people in the local communities. 
CBNRM placed emphasis on the need to connect the use and management of natural 
resources such as wildlife with the expected economic benefits from wildlife tourism 
(Rozemeijer, 2003). 
CBNRM is thus a development and conservation strategy based on the idea that the 
preservation of natural resources is closely connected with rural economic development and 
sustainable livelihood. Child & Barnes (2010: 283) defines CBNRM as “a process of 
institutional reform that involves the devolution and clear definition of property rights with 
collective action in rural communities to improve the value and sustainability of natural 
resources”. The other important assumption in CBNRM is that if the communities are granted 
the power and responsibility over natural resources on their own land, they could manage and 
conserve them in a more sustainable manner provided they generate benefits from their 
utilization and conservation (Weaver, 2013).  
Roe and Nelson (2009a:5) have  defined CBNRM as  “a term  that refers to the local 
management of natural resources such as land, forests, wildlife and water through, locally 
established institutions for local benefits”. The conceptual foundation of CBNRM thus 
includes the following: sustainable utilization of natural resources and the provision of 
appropriate economic benefits to the local communities or land owners involved in natural 
resource management and conservation (De Kock, 2010). The other key conceptual 
foundation is the transfer of user and access rights and management decision from the state 
over natural resources to the relevant local institutional structures or arrangements 
(devolution). CBNRM also embodies principle of collective ownership which allows defined 
groups of people in the community to use and exercise their ownership and access rights over 
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natural resources based on collectively agreed upon rules, regulation and strategies 
(Murphree, 2004). 
Despite the above highlighted assumptions about CBNRM, the main question that still 
remains without a clear answer among its advocates has been its success when measured 
against collective ownership, transfer of user and access rights and management decisions 
from the state to local institutions. For this reason, CBNRM has been widely and largely 
contested because of differences in its implementation and varying performance outcomes 
within and across countries in Africa. Its record regarding its success and failure remains 
subjective and there is lack of general consensus and awareness with regard to its contribution 
to development priories at the national level and conditions under which it could effectively 
succeed (Dzingirai, 2005). 
The main focus of this study however is on CBNRM in Botswana and Zambia and not 
Southern Africa as whole. Botswana and Zambia share a similar history when it comes to 
natural resources management and conservation. Both countries previously followed similar a 
traditional approach to natural resources governance under control of tradition chiefs before 
the coming of western colonial powers. They also both suffered a similar fate when the 
colonial powers came in and introduced centralized natural resources management policies 
and legislation which led to the exclusion of the local people from their traditional land and 
other natural resources such as wildlife. Furthermore, the post-colonial government in the two 
countries continued with the same colonial policies for conservation and natural resources 
management until the early 1980s when they both decided to adopt their first CBNRM 
programmes with the support of the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID). However, even though Zambia adopted CBNRM at the same time as Botswana, the 
country is still faced with the threat of wildlife depletion due to illegal wildlife poaching and 
trade. Zambia is also still behind on the process of involving the local communities in natural 
resources management and conservation. Contrastingly Botswana has managed to emerge as 
one of the few exceptional CBNRM success stories in Africa and has achieved significant 
results through the involvement of the local people in management of natural resources such 
as wildlife resources (Rozemeijer, 2003). 
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1.1 Aim of the Study 
The main aim of this study was to provide further and detailed insights into the factors that 
explain success and failure in the co-management of natural resource. This study was 
conducted in particular to provide an understanding concerning the factors that have made 
Botswana to record relatively better outcomes in CBNRM as compared to Zambia despite the 
two countries having followed a similar approach to natural resource management and 
conservation. The outcomes in CBNRM mentioned here range from increased community 
participation in natural resources management, empowerment of the local community through 
ownership rights and access rights to the resources, provision of social and economic benefits 
and improved management and conservation systems. The highlighted study aim and main 
research question was accomplished by answering specific research questions in the context 
of Botswana and Zambia.  
1.2.0 Main Research Question 
 What factors have made Botswana to attain relatively better outcomes in 
CBNRM as compared to Zambia? 
In order to answer the main research question of this study above, the following sub-research 
questions were developed: 
1.2.1 Sub-Research Questions 
 To what extent have wildlife policies and legislations devolved the responsibility and 
decision authority to manage wildlife to the local people in the community? 
 Do wildlife conservation policies and legislations at the national level require and 
encourage community own land and wildlife resources in protected or controlled 
hunting areas (CHAs)? 
 To what extent are the communities involved in deciding how the benefits (revenue) 
from community based wildlife conservation and tourism should be distributed? 
 To what extent has CBNRM contributed to wildlife conservation in Botswana and 
Zambia? 
1.3 Relevance of the Study 
Understanding why some countries succeed and others fail in implementing CBNRM is 
important for informing public policy. This study was expected to contribute to existing 
literature on the management of shared natural resource through community based natural 
management practices. It was also expected that this research would contribute towards policy 
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making and the development of better strategies for creating sustainable local institutions and 
the promotion of co-management in natural resource conservation. 
1.4 Organisation of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured into six main chapters. The subsequent chapters of this this thesis 
comprise of the literature review, theoretical framework, research methodology, presentation 
of empirical findings and discussion of results. A precise conclusion is finally drawn from the 
main discussion of findings in the final chapter of this thesis. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are a lot of studies that demonstrates that the local people are well and better placed to 
manage, protect and conserve natural resources within their own locality. This study reviewed 
current and existing literature on the management of shared natural resources commonly 
known as common pool resources (CPRs) around the world. Common-pool resources are in 
this case were defined as goods which are available for all to consume and to which no one 
can be excluded and that their consumption could only be limited at a high cost (Ostrom, 
1990). 
2.1 Definition of Success in CBNRM 
Before discussing what kinds of elements are important for success in CBNRM, it is 
important to define what success meant is in this case. Defining success in CBNRM differs 
from author to author. According to Roe et al. (2009a:9), success in CBNRM is seen when 
“the local communities’ livelihood is improved and natural resources such as land, forests and 
wildlife are effectively managed and utilized sustainably without overexploitation and 
depletion”. Others look at CBNRM as being successful when the local community takes 
control of high value utilization of a resource both in terms of income generated and other 
associated benefits from the utilization of a resource (Löwegren, 2013). CBNRM can also be 
deemed successful when the local people are granted ownership or tenure rights over the 
resource on their land (Fabricius and Collins, 2007; Anderson and Mehta, 2013). Boudreaux 
and Nelson (2011:7), view CBRNM to be successful when “the management of natural 
resources by the local community produces positive results in terms of rural development”. 
Rural development in this case includes things such as improved local infrastructure such as 
roads, schools, hospitals, good water and sanitation systems), reduced poaching of wildlife, 
13 
 
 
recovery and stabilization in wildlife species population and improved governance of locally 
established institutions (Measham and Lumbasi, 2013).  
For Campbell and Shackleton, (2001), CBNRM is successful when “the local people in the 
community are encouraged to participate the in decision making activities or processes 
regarding when to use and how to use natural resources”. In this study the definition of 
success in CBNRM by Roe et.al. (2009) was adopted as it makes it clear that that success 
could only be attained when conservation and rural development goals are achieved at the 
same time. 
2.2 Previous Research 
Scholars, such as Boggs (2000), have postulated that the management and conservation of 
natural resources through a top-down approach using state institutions, has been inefficient 
and ineffective in natural resources conservation in the recent past. Therefore, the only 
solution to this problem is transfer of authority for managing natural resources to the local 
community in order to promote sustainable utilization of natural resources. Accordingly, 
Mbaiwa (2011) argues that devolution of the powers and responsibility to manage natural 
resources should be seen as a solution to the severe decline in wildlife species and depletion 
of natural resources which occur as a result of the inefficiency of the central government in 
natural resource management. Devolution of natural resources management in this case 
entails, the redistribution of authority and transfer of responsibilities from the state institutions 
to the local community who reside side by side with natural resources (Boggs, 2000). This 
shift in the balance of power and responsibility is perceived to have the potential to increase 
community access, power and control over natural resources among the local community. It is 
also said to have the potential to improve the attitude of people within the local community 
towards sustainable utilization of natural resources and that it contribute to increased 
economic and social benefits such as employment and poverty reduction in the community 
(Scott, 1993). 
According to Mbaiwa (2005), one of the expected benefits from community based 
conservation and management is that it allows for an equitable and more democratic treatment 
of the local communities compared to the fortress approach to conservation. He further points 
out that this approach to natural resource management and conservation changes the way 
people in the local community looks at wildlife and make them realize the importance of their 
support and participation in managing and preserving it. This argument has also been widely 
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echoed in studies that have highlighted empowerment of the local communities as the most 
significant success factor in community based wildlife management and conservation (Kull, 
2002). 
Other scholars have highlighted the importance of partnership among the local communities, 
NGOs, private sector and government as another key ingredient needed to ensure the success 
of CBNRM. Tsing (2005) for instance argues that, the empowerment of the local communities 
can only be understood in the context of interaction between the people at the local level and 
other stakeholders in natural resource management. In this case the success the of any 
CBNRM programmes cannot be understood without understanding the role of the state, 
private sector and NGOs and the relationship that exists among them and the local 
communities. Bleike (2006), similarly states that there is need for greater interaction among 
NGOs, the state and participating communities for CBNRM to be a success. Taylor-Ide and 
Taylor (2002) have also highlighted the need for a three-way kind of partnership among the 
local communities (from the bottom-up), state authority (top-down) and NGOs and other 
relevant stakeholders (outside-in). 
Previous research has also highlighted the importance of the transfer of decision making 
powers and responsibility over natural resources from the state to locally established 
institution. A study in Nepal revealed that the capacity of the local community was 
undermined due to lack of devolution of authority and responsibility to issue property rights 
(Bawa, 2007). Salam et al. (2006), similarly found that the government in Thailand had been 
supporting sustainable management of forests for almost 100 years but does not support and 
recognize the local community in forest management which has led to lack of local 
institutionalization and devolution at the local level.  
In another study in Tanzania enhanced capacity of the local communities was found to be 
effective in monitoring of natural resources and enforcement of rules, regulations and agreed 
upon sanction by the community. For example Holmern et al. (2007), found that village 
scouts were effective in apprehending poachers but were still affected by lack of financial 
resources and insufficient support from the state law enforcement agencies in Tanzania. In 
this case for community based wildlife management programmes to be effective, the local 
community should have wildlife monitoring strategies to be able to keep in check a 
sustainable level of resource harvest (Du Toit, 2002). 
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Furthermore, CBNRM as a model for conservation requires a win-win situation where both 
conservation and development goals are achieved simultaneously. For a community based 
conservation Programme to be a success, active participation from the local community is 
needed and the benefits for participation in the programme to the local community must be 
clearly stipulated. The problems caused by lack of community participation have been 
documented and are disastrous. Many studies have found a direct relationship between local 
community attitudes towards natural resource conservation and the expected material benefits 
to the community (Berger et al. 2004; Baral and Gantam, 2007). A similar study in Nepal 
found that the local communities were willing to lose their livestock in a bid to conserve the 
population of tigers provided the benefits from trophy hunting were distributed to the 
community in a fair manner and that they were granted the rights to own land (Romanach et 
al. 2007). 
On a similar level Shepard et al. (2010), evaluated a community based wildlife management 
Programme that was initiated by the local community and their traditional chief in Ghana in 
order to protect the Hippopotamus and recover their dwindling population. This Programme 
was found to be among the few success stories of wildlife conservation programmes in Africa. 
Sheppard et al. (2010), identified community participation and equal distribution of benefits 
and local community empowerment as some of the factors that defined the success of this 
Programme. The Programme led to stabilization in the population of the hippopotamus and 
also contributed to increased community benefits in terms of infrastructural development and 
increased control and access to natural resources. 
Finally in Mozambique for instance, Solomon (2000) concluded that although community 
based wildlife management was embodied in legislation and policies, there is little and lack of 
implementation and lack of devolution of decision making authority and responsibility to 
manage and conserve wildlife to the local community. Lack of decentralization has been 
associated with challenges relating to governance such as institutionalized corruption as the 
main constraint affecting the transfer of decision making authority over natural resources to 
the local communities (Anstey, et al. 2002). 
In summary, previous research has shown some of the factors that seem to predict success and 
failure in CBNRM. These success factors include the following: transfer decision making 
powers over natural resources (devolution), ownership and user rights, community 
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participation, equal distribution of benefits, partnership between the local communities, 
private sector and government. Therefore the absence of all these factors in the 
implementation of CBRNM should be expected to predict and explain failure. Thus this study 
focused on investigating whether these same factors could help us understand why Botswana 
has relatively succeeded in CBNRM as compared to Zambia. 
2.3 Theoretical Framework 
The growing global concern about over exploitation of natural resources, depletion and 
environmental degradation has led to a rapid growth in literature on the management of 
common-pool resources. Failure by the state in the management of CPRs in this regard has 
made the local community to seem as an effective alternative actor in the management of 
common or shared natural resources (Ostrom, et al. 2002).Common-pool resources refer to 
the type of good which are available for all to consume and to which no one could be 
excluded and that consumption can only be limited at a very high cost (Ostrom, 1990). Some 
examples of resources that are considered as CPRs include fisheries, wildlife, forest, river 
basins and oceans.  The characteristics of CPRs are said to create a social dilemma in 
circumstances where actors are motivated by their selfish desire to maximize their individual 
benefits leading to outcomes that are not in the long term interest of anyone (Ostrom, et al. 
1999). Hence, when resource users harvest without formal rules and regulations limiting 
access, clear rights, duties and responsibilities, free riding is likely to occur in two ways; 
firstly there will be over exploitation of the resource without considering the impact that such 
extraction has on other users of the resource. Secondly, there will be lack of commitment to 
the maintenance and preservation of the resource itself (Ostrom et al. 1994). 
Early scholars on the governance of common pool resources such as Hardin (1968), in his 
article “the tragedy of commons” argued that “the only way through which the commons 
could be sustained over an extended period of time is through a two state-established 
institutional arrangement, which is central government control and private property regimes 
(1968:2)”. He further argued that the users of common resources are trapped in a common 
dilemma and each one of them is forced to maximize his benefits without limits and thus not 
able to find the solution to the commons problem. The end result in this game is over 
exploitation and depletion of the common resource (ibid). 
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Different scholars focusing on the governance of the commons have however criticized 
Hardin’s claims by highlighting the fact that, private property regimes and central government 
control have not been efficient in preventing the depletion of common pool resources. Among 
such scholars are Ostrom (1990) and Bromley (1994), who have argued that natural resources 
could be used in a sustainable manner provided that certain principles are followed and 
applied and that these principles include autonomy and recognition of the local resource users 
and tenure rights for local institutions. This requires the establishment and enforcement rules 
and appropriate incentives in the form of benefits that far exceeds the perceived costs for 
preserving natural resources (ibid). When these principles are combined together they can 
result in the full redistribution of power and responsibilities from the central government to 
the local lower community levels. Ipara et al. (2005), similarly stress that for this 
redistribution of power to achieve meaningful results in wildlife conservation, it should be 
accompanied further by tangible benefits to the local users as well as secure property rights to 
land, wildlife resources capacity building and improved livelihood for the local people. In 
order to manage CPRs effectively in this case, resource users need to be committed to how the 
resource is used and should respect the rules and regulations that impose restrictions on the 
extraction of the resource. 
Furthermore, Ostrom et al. (1999:279) state that “external authorities must deliberately 
formulate and monitor and enforce the rules that impose restrictions on who should use the 
resource, how much and when that use should be allowed, create and finance formal 
monitoring arrangements and establish sanctions for non-compliance”. Dietz et al. 
(2003:1909), similarly state “that the design of such rules and regulations must be followed by 
all resources users and that imposing appropriate punishment on those that fail to comply 
could be effective in managing CPRs”.  
Pomeroy and Berkes (1997), state that CPRs cannot be managed effectively without active 
participation and partnership between resource users and the State. Both actors would realize 
the benefits if they effectively cooperate in a co-management arrangement. For example the 
resource user would benefit from the fact that the state   makes sure that other resource users 
abide by rules and regulations that regulates resource extraction. As a result natural resources 
would be managed in a sustainable manner for the long benefit of everyone (Sjostedt, 2014).  
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It was therefore expected that for CBNRM to succeed, the state need to relinquish some of its 
powers and authority over natural resources to the local communities. The local communities 
in this regard should be given rights to ownership over land and other resources such as 
wildlife and be recognized as direct beneficiaries of natural resources in their area. This 
requires the establishment of independent local institutions and appropriate incentives that 
could enhance community participation and commitment in the management and preservation 
of natural resources. The state could facilitate this through the adoption and implementation 
of legislation and policies that provide an enabling policy and legal framework for co-
management of CPRs. 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
3.1 Case selection 
This was a comparative case study of CBNRM in Botswana and Zambia. These two countries 
were selected for the purpose of this study because they share a lot of things in common when 
it comes to their history, geography, ecology and their political and state institutions. Both are 
land locked countries located in the heart of southern Africa and share the same border. 
Zambia and Botswana share the same colonial legacy as both countries are former colonies of 
Great Britain and got their independence in the in the early 1960s (Mupeta, 2012). They are 
also both democratic republican countries and hold regular elections. Both Zambia and 
Botswana are heavily endowed with a diverse of wildlife and other natural resources’. For 
instance Botswana’s protected areas cover up to 37.19% the total country’s landmass while 
Zambia’s protected areas take up 37.78% of the country’s total land area. In both countries 
wildlife is the biggest spotlight in the tourism industry and over 90% of the tourists come to 
see wildlife animals, however this is not a precondition but rather a main feature of policy 
(Mbaiwa, 2011). 
These two countries also adopted CBNRM initiatives more than two decades ago and were 
financially supported by USAID and the main focus was on wildlife conservation. Both 
countries adopted similar wildlife conservation policies and legislation along with the 
CBNRM model in the 1990s. They also established state and local institution for managing 
wildlife. In both countries CBNRM is implemented through community based organizations 
called community trusts (CTs) in Botswana while in Zambia, they a called community 
resource boards (CRBs).Thus, this the most similar design for these two countries that have a 
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long experience with CBNRM and share a lot of features in common. These counties only 
differ in terms of micro economic factors such as gross domestic product (GDP) and 
demographic factors such as the population size. Nevertheless, in as much as comparisons of 
similar elements in a study like this one are significant, it is imperative that there exist some 
variations in the selected cases. This is important as it enables the researcher to design a rich 
analytical comparative study (George and Bennet 2005). 
3.2 Research Design 
The research design adopted for this study was a comparative case study of CBNRM in 
Botswana and Zambia. This method was chosen because it suitable for comparing similar 
cases   within and across time and context. This a good design for a study such as this one 
which requires a better understanding of how different features within specific contexts have 
affected the success of programmes or policy interventions. This method allows the researcher 
to analyze and also identify differences and similarities between two cases that share a lot of 
characteristics in common (Goodrick, 2014: 1). This design was also suitable for answering 
the type of research question which was posed in this study as it helped me to identify the key 
factors that explain the differences in the outcome of CBNRM in Botswana and Zambia. This 
information is very important when it comes to identifying specific measures that should be 
adopted to produce desirable outcomes from a programme or policy initiative like CBNRM. 
This is what differentiates this research design from other research designs such as 
experimental and quasi-experimental design as it allows a research to repeatedly develop 
sequences based on various propositions, synthesis and collection of empirical evidence 
(Goodrick, 2014: 2).However, the main limitation of this research design is that it is difficult 
to make generalization to other cases where context and geography aspects matters more. 
3.3 Data Collection Procedure 
In this study data was drawn from a triangulation of various secondary sources of data. In this 
study I made use of different sources of secondary data that assess the performance and status 
of CBNRM in both Botswana and Zambia. Triangulation of different sources secondary 
information was done in order to avoid bias and representation of single voice with its own 
agenda. According to Merriam (1998:70) “the technique of data collection adopted in any 
study is determined by the researcher’s theoretical orientation or know how, the aim of the 
study and the problem of the study”. To achieve this I conducted an extensive review of 
20 
 
 
existing status reports and publications produced by state and non-state actors such as NGO 
reports and peer reviewed scholarly articles and expert reports on CBNRM in both countries. 
Government policies and legislation relating to CBNRM were also analyzed in this study. The 
collected documents were later summarized and critically analyzed. I was thus able to obtain 
and read all these documents in their original form. This was done to get the historical context 
of CBNRM in both countries. This also enabled me to compare and identify the differences 
and similarities that exist between the two countries in terms of their institutional 
arrangements in natural resource governance and their performance outcomes in CBNRM. 
One of the main important advantages of using documents as data is their stability. When 
compared to other methods such as interviews and participant observation, the presence of the 
researcher does not affect what is being investigated. This is good for the ensuring reliability 
of the study. However, the disadvantage of using official documents is that we do not whether 
what is written on paper is enforced in practice or actually implemented (Merriam, 1998: 
126). 
3.4 Data Analysis 
In this study I employed qualitative content analysis of text from various secondary sources of 
data. This method of data analysis was chosen in order to uncover the underlying factors 
explaining the differences in the outcome CBNRM in the two countries. I analyzed large 
quantities of data by organizing them into major themes developed through thorough review 
and analysis of different texts. The theoretical framework developed in the theory section was 
be used to analyze the results for this study. This method of analysis is objective as it allows  
the researcher to define clearly themes or categories to apply to the data being analyzed 
(Bauru, 2000).Using this method of data analysis, I was able to translate large volumes of data 
by categorizing them into major themes outlined in next chapter of this thesis. Based on the 
developed theoretical framework, I was able to identify key variables which I used as my 
initial coding categories. The operational definitions for these variables were derived from the 
developed theoretical framework. This method of analyzing data is suitable for this type of 
study as it allows the researcher to provide evidence that either supports or refutes existing 
theory (Hsiu- Hsieh and Shanon, 2005).  
3.5 Operationalization of Variables 
Success of CBNRM in this study was looked at in terms of effective management and 
sustainable use of natural resources by the community. Sustainable use in this study refers to 
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what Roe et al. (2009a:9) describes as when “the local communities’ livelihood is improved 
and natural resources such as wildlife are effectively managed and utilized sustainably 
without depletion or complete loss of biodiversity”. This was measured by looking at 
management and conservation strategies adopted in CBNRM in both countries. Success was 
also measured by looking at the impact of CBRNM on wildlife populations, their recovery 
and also the benefits the community realize from wildlife utilization and conservation in terms 
of rural development.Success in CBNRM in this study was thus explained using the following 
explanatory variables:  transfer of decision making authority and responsibility to manage 
wildlife, ownership rights to the resource such as land and wildlife, decision making rights 
over the distribution of social and economic benefits from CBNRM, CBOs organisation 
(institutional capacity) and community participation and support for wildlife conservation 
(Community Policing and monitoring). All these explanatory variables were used to assess 
how Botswana and Zambia have performed in CBNRM particularly in wildlife management 
and in enhancing the livelihoods of the local people. The above explanatory variables for 
CBNRM were operationally defined and measured as follows: 
Devolution – Transfer of some of the state’s authority and decision making powers over a 
resources to locally and independently established institutions. 
Collective Ownership – Does the state allow and encourage the local communities to define 
themselves and give them the rights to own resources and decision making power and control 
with regard to when and how to utilize resources? 
Revenue Sharing Arrangement – Does the state allow the local communities to retain 100% of 
the income generated from resource utilization? Or is there any sharing arrangement between 
the state and the local institutions involved in CBNRM? 
Organisation of Local Institutions – are community based organisations for CBRNM 
democratically and independently established? (Anna et al. 2007). 
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3.6 Analytical Framework for Successful CBNRM 
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3.7 Limitations of the Study 
Using secondary data, the researcher was limited by other peoples’ focus. Having primary 
data, the researcher could tailor the data according to his or her own interest. I initially wanted 
to supplement the secondary data with data from interviews with key informants but I was not 
able to do so due to the poor response I received from the people I expected to be my key 
informants in this study. It took almost two months writing emails and making telephone calls 
but this did not however yield any positive results. 
4. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
This section presents empirical results from document review which included the review of 
legislation and policy analyses in Botswana and Zambia, published articles, existing NGOs’ 
CBNRM status reports and government reports from 2005 to 2015. This section starts with 
the contextual and historical discussion of CBNRM in both Botswana and Zambia starting 
from the pre-colonial, colonial and post colonialism (Classical paradigm of natural resource 
conservation) and the rise of CBNRM. It further goes on to present empirical results on the 
actual implementation of CBNRM and the actual outcomes in both countries. 
4.1 Historical Context of Wildlife Management and Conservation in 
Botswana 
4.1.1 Pre-Colonial Period 
Botswana is among the few countries in Southern Africa that is still heavily endowed with 
abundant natural resources, particularly wildlife, birds, insects, forests, fish, reptiles and many 
other living things. During the pre-colonial period, wildlife resources played a significant role 
in sustaining the livelihood of the local people in the early traditional society of Botswana. 
Wildlife provided the local people with game meat, animal skins and fur for their clothing 
among many other things. During this period, natural resources were traditionally and 
communally owned and controlled by the local people under traditional leadership. The 
sharing of their utilization among all members of the community was an important norm in 
the local traditional culture of Botswana. Local community stewardship and collective 
ownership made sure that no single member of the community maximized individual benefits 
from resource utilization at the expense of the entire community. As a result, the communities 
themselves took control of their own resources through traditional leaders and communal 
policing (Child and Barnes, 2010). 
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4.1.2 Colonial Period 
This period in Botswana was characterized by centralized control on natural resource 
management and continued throughout the post-colonial time. The advent of Colonialism and 
European trade in Botswana between the period 1885-1996 largely affected access rights to 
natural resources especially wildlife and  altered the role of locally established institutions for 
natural resource management and conservation. One of the key laws that were adopted during 
this time was the Bechuanaland Protectorate Game Proclamation of 1925.This law 
particularly called for the establishment of national parks, game reserves and wildlife 
sanctuaries aimed at protecting wildlife species within areas designated as protected areas 
(PAs). It is this law that established national game parks such as Gemsbok National Park, 
Chobe Game Reserves, the Kalahari Game Reserves and the Moremi Game Reserves. The 
British colonial Government also reorganized games areas into three categories, the royal 
game, and small game and large games respectively (Taylor and Murphree, 2007). As a 
consequence, this proclamation law centralized the control and management of natural 
resources particularly wildlife in Botswana. The creation of national parks and protected areas 
displaced the local people and robbed them of their ownership rights over land and wildlife 
resources which previously belonged to them before the coming of British colonialists 
(Bolaane, 2004). 
4.1.3 Post-Colonial Period 
After gaining independence from Great Britain in 1966, the post-colonial government in 
Botswana decided to continue with the same colonial policies that centralized the control and 
management of natural resources. During this period, the post-colonial government of 
Botswana adopted the Fauna Conservation Act No.47 in 1979. This legislation abolished the 
system of having separate regulations for each tribal area and combined them into a single set 
of rules and regulations which were going to be applied through the entire country (Mbaiwa, 
2005). The main purpose of this Act was to control and regulate licensing procedures for 
hunting. As result centralization of natural resources further distorted the relationship between 
the local community and the state. Loss of access to land, hunting and gathering rights led to 
the decline of traditional local institutions and created hostilities among the local people 
towards government and conversation in the 1970s and 1980s (Mandota, 2011). Hunting wild 
animals for subsistence and livelihood purposes was now considered as illegal hunting 
because it did not fall within the newly adopted approach to wildlife utilization. Thus, both 
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the colonial and post-colonial periods in Botswana were characterized by depletion in the 
natural resource base (Mbaiwa, 2011). 
4.1.4 The Emergence of CBNRM in Botswana 
CBNRM was initiated in Botswana in the late 1980s, a period when the management of 
natural resources especially wildlife by the central government was experiencing frequent and 
sharp decline. The central control of natural resources by the state Botswana had excluded the 
local communities from natural resources which they previously owned and controlled. This 
shift from traditional approaches to natural resource management and conservation to central 
control by the state had serious consequences. CBNRM was therefore adopted as an 
alternative conservations strategy aimed at addressing all these problems caused the state 
centralization of natural resource management and prevent further decline in the natural 
resource base (Mbaiwa, 2011). 
The first CBRNM Programme in Botswana was officially initiated and launched in 1989. This 
Programme was initiated by the government of Botswana with support from USAID. To 
spearhead this Programme, the government of Botswana and USAID launched what was 
called the Joint Natural Resource Management Project under the Department of Wildlife and 
National Parks (DWNP). CBNRM in Botswana was adopted after the realization that 
preservation of natural resources such as wildlife could be easier and possible with the 
reintroduction of active participation and support from the local communities living in 
conservation designated areas such as  controlled hunting areas (CHAs) (Johnson, 2009).  
4.1.5 Policy and Legislative Framework for CBNRM in Botswana 
Before the introduction of CBNRM in Botswana, the local people residing in wildlife 
designated areas did not have access rights to land for tourism development. It is the wildlife 
conservation policy of 1986 and the tourism policy of 1990 that set the foundation and basis 
for the development of CBNRM in Botswana. The wildlife conservation policy of 1986 was 
the blue-print for the reintroduction of community participation in wildlife management and 
conservation through the implementation CBNRM in Botswana. This policy was formulated 
in order to facilitate the implementation of tourism projects aimed at promoting economic 
development in rural areas. This policy also acknowledged and recognized the potential 
benefits that consumptive and non-consumptive utilization of wildlife resources could have 
for the local people living side by side with natural resources. Through the wildlife 
conservation policy of 1986, land in game management areas (GMAs) was demarcated and 
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subdivided into small landholding called controlled hunting areas (CHAs) in order to enable 
the local community to  own land and actively participate in the development of CBNRM 
(Blaike, 2006).  
The government of Botswana under the Ministry of Tourism and the Department of Wildlife 
and National Parks (DWNP) did this by earmarking CHAs for certain local communities. 
Thereafter, the local communities were required to register their community based 
organization (CBOs) in order for them to obtain leases for CHAs. The Department of Land 
and Land Boards were established for this particular purpose in Botswana. As a result, CBOs 
in Botswana are granted user rights and resource management authority over CHAs through 
leases which are designed to run for a period of 15 years. The CBOs decide on the type of 
tourism activities or business to embark on when the lease for CHAs is finally out. In this case 
the CBOs can either decide to use CHAs for hunting or photographic tourism (Rihoy and 
Maguranyanga, 2007). 
CBOs can also chose utilize CHAs and wildlife quotas as follows: (a) community 
management of CHAs (b) sub-leasing of their user rights for the resource to private safari 
companies at a fee or (c) they can decide to enter into a joint venture partnership with a safari 
company through shareholding. The demarcation of wildlife areas in this manner 
demonstrates the willingness on the part of the government of Botswana to return to local 
ownership and custodianship in natural resource management. These reforms in resource use 
particularly access to land and associated natural resources should be seen as a form of 
empowerment to the local community in Botswana (Poteete, 2009). 
The tourism policy of 1990 is another policy that has provided an enabling environment for 
the development and implementation of CBNRM in Botswana. In this policy, tourism is seen 
as one of the key drivers of economic growth and economic development. This policy calls 
for the diversification of the country’s economy and supports a shift from heavy reliance on 
diamond mining to the promotion of tourism development. This policy also recognizes the 
importance of community support and participation in the development of the tourism in rural 
areas. This policy supports equitable and fair distribution of direct and indirect benefits from 
both trophy hunting and photographic tourism to the local communities for them to appreciate 
the importance and value of sustainable use, management and conservation of wildlife in their 
areas. This policy also calls for the creation of employment through tourism to enable the 
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local people generate income and also prevent rural-urban drift and stimulate the provision of 
essential services such health and education in remote  rural areas of the country (Mbaiwa, 
2013). 
Another milestone in the development of CBNRM in Botswana was the enactment of the 
Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act of 1992. This Act makes provisions for the 
protection, conservation and use of wildlife in areas that are not designated as protected areas. 
The killing and hunting of wild animals such as elephants and rhinos is strictly regulated 
under this Act (Johnson, 2009). Nevertheless, the hunting of wildlife can be carried out in 
WMAs and CHAs provided the hunter has a hunting license or permit. These licenses include 
small game licenses, single game license and special game license and the minister’s license 
all of which are only given to citizens of Botswana. This Act also makes provisions for land 
owners to hunt animals that are not protected or that are partially protected on their own land 
without a hunting license or permit. The land owners are also allowed under this Act to 
impose fees on external resource users with the approval of the director of wildlife. The only 
requirement in this case is that all land owners must keep records of all the wild animals killed 
and submit these records annually to the licensing authorities. The land owners are also 
granted the rights to establish game ranches or farms which give them exclusive rights to hunt 
or capture wild animals on their land (Mbaiwa, 2008). 
The development of CBNRM in Botswana was further supported through the adoption of the 
CBNRM policy of 2007. This policy was an outcome of many years of hard work by the 
Ministry of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism, working closely with relevant stakeholders 
such as NGOs, local communities and actors in the private sector. Before the adoption of this 
policy, CBNRM was functional without a specific policy framework to guide it. However, 
prior to the adoption of this policy, CBNRM was facilitated through the already discussed 
polices and legislations. As a consequence, the power relationship between the state and the 
local people and personal interest dynamics within the local community had negatively 
affected the welfare and interests of the wider local community (Masilo-rakgoasi, 2008).  
The CBRM policy of 2007 recognizes the fact that the local people who live side by side with 
the natural resources generally bear the greatest costs associated with conservation. Thus, this 
policy stipulates that given proper recognition, awareness and appropriate incentives, the local 
communities are more likely to benefit from conservation of natural resources within their 
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own environment. It also states that, for the local communities to actively participate in 
natural resources management and conservation, the benefits of conservation must far exceed 
the costs associated conserving the particular resource. The main aim for adopting this policy 
was to provide the local communities with appropriate incentives for sustainable utilization, 
management and conservation of wildlife resources (Lindsay et al. 2007). 
4.1.6 Nature of Devolution in the Management of Wildlife Resources in Botswana 
The ownership and custodianship aspect of natural resources management has played a 
significant role in the development of CBNRM in Botswana. This though requires the transfer 
of decision making authority over land and other natural resources such as wildlife from the 
state to locally established institutional arrangement. In Botswana, local communities 
encouraged to participate natural resource management through establishment of community 
based organizations (CBOs) known as Community Trusts (CTs). These CTs provide local 
leadership to local level institutions of CBNRM.CTs also provide coordination in tourism 
activities on behalf of their respective communities. The functioning of CTs is guided by a 
locally formulated constitution which dictates on issues relating to membership, duties and 
responsibilities and the organization of each CT. All members of the local community above 
the age of 18 years are automatic members of CTs in their locality. In this regard, 
administrative duties of CTs are executed by the Board of Trustees (BTs) who work hand in 
hand with local traditional chiefs (Mbaiwa, 2011). 
The Board of Trustees is the supreme board of the CT whose members are democratically 
elected during a public meeting known as Kgotla after every 2 years. The board of trustees is 
responsible for handling and managing all the affairs of a CT on behalf of the people in the 
local community. These affairs range from signing of legal documents such as leases and 
business contracts with private safari companies and the maintenance of close contact with 
Trust’s legal officers. These legal officers are employed and paid by CTs and responsible for 
providing such services as writing of constitutions and contracts. The Board of Trustees also 
maintains and keeps records for CTs which include financial accounts and reports which they 
are required to present during the annual general meeting. Additionally, to be considered 
credible legitimate all CTs are required to embrace traditional authority represented by chiefs 
and village department committee members (VDC) who permanent members of the Board of 
Trustees (Anderson and Mehta, 2013). 
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4.1.7 Nature of Resource Tenure Rights and Ownership in Botswana 
Despite the government of Botswana retaining all ownership rights over wildlife resources, 
the local communities have the opportunity to obtain wildlife quotas in CHAs given to them 
through various policy directives. In most cases, rights are often sold to safari enterprises. 
These rights can be traced as far back as 1986 in Botswana when the wild life policy sub-
divided wildlife management areas (WMAs) in CHAs that could be designated to CBOs 
through District Land Boards (DLBs). In Botswana CTs are given 15 year leases for their 
respective CHAs. Through these leases the local communities are given management 
authority and user rights in their designated CHAs during the stipulated time period (Collomb, 
et al. 2010).  
The local communities through their various CBOs have three options to make in managing in 
managing CHAs. These options include sub-leasing of wildlife resource utilization to safari 
companies, community management and joint partnership with the tourism companies. 
Nevertheless, the sub-lease arrangement is the most common among these due to lack of skills 
and expertise and the needed capital by the local to effectively run tourism activities barely on 
their own. Furthermore, the local communities can enter into partnership with local safari 
companies in the ownership and management of tourism. The local communities also have 
rights to extract veld products (food, medicine, oil, insects and plants) on communal land as 
long as they possess a license to do so. The local communities are also given user and 
commercialization rights for these veld products and wildlife resources through the lease 
agreements signed with District Land Boards (Anderson and Mehta, 2013). 
In addition, CBOs in Botswana previously retained all the revenue generated from wildlife 
tourism and made all the decisions regarding the distribution and use of it. However, the 
CBNRM policy of 2007 reversed this as it requires CBOs to return 65% of all the revenue 
generated from wildlife tourism to a national trust fund. All the revenue deposited in this trust 
fund is used to support other CBOs throughout the country. However, the CTs are allowed to 
apply back for it. This revenue sharing arrangement has nevertheless been criticized as it is 
now seen to break the link between input and output of CBNRM activities in Botswana. This 
centralized formula for revenue sharing has also been criticized as it conflicts the logic of 
CBNRM and weakens the motivation for conservation and negatively affects the 
empowerment of the local communities (Poteete, 2009). 
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The demand for application for the trust fund income also entails loss of autonomy for CBOs 
are they are required to meet the conditions set by the government for use. The sharing 
arrangement of income from CBNRM was reversed by the government of Botswana after the 
realization that most of CBOs across the country were misappropriating income generated 
from wildlife tourism. The Board of Trustees were also misappropriating funds he local 
communities of this income (USAID, 2014). Despite this, the demarcation of wildlife 
resource rich areas for the purpose of CBNRM still demonstrate a significant return to 
stewardship and custodianship of natural resource management to the local communities.  
In Botswana, devolution and effective governance of natural resource has therefore been 
realized through the formulation of effective legislation and polices which support the 
granting of tenure rights to the local communities to own land and exercise a considerable 
level of authority over wildlife resources through their respective CBOs. CBOs allow the 
local communities they represent to participate and realize benefits from tourism activities in 
their own areas. CTs also decide on how land and wildlife resources should be used in their 
designated CHAs. Through collective action, the local people in Botswana have established 
effective local institutions to ensure community participation in the management of wildlife 
resources and tourism development (Mbaiwa, 2013). 
4.2.0 CBNRM Benefits and their Distribution in Botswana 
In Botswana benefits realized from CBNRM can be put into three main categories and these 
include individual benefits, social and financial Services and community benefits (Arntzen, 
2007). In Botswana individual benefits from CBNRM have produced positive impacts on the 
individual households and their livelihood in areas where it has been effectively implemented. 
These individual household benefits include income earnings and the creation of employment 
opportunities for the local people. Employment is one of the key benefits that the local 
communities receive from CBNRM projects. For instance in 2011 and 2012 respectively, a 
total number of 610 local people were directly employed in 14 CBOs out of 45 CBOs. 
Additionally, in 2008 more than 8000 people from the local communities around the country 
were employed in a number of CBNRM projects. Johnson (2009), also reports that a total 
number of 629 local people were employed between 2009 and 2010 in CBNRM project in 
Ngamiland district of Botswana. This estimate of 8000 people being employed in CBNRM 
projects represents such a huge number given the fact that most of the programmes are 
implemented in remote rural areas of Botswana where the population is largely small and the 
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presence of industrial enterprises that are supposed to provide employment to local the people 
in these rural areas are non-existent (Schuster, 2007). 
Wildlife based CBOs in both Chobe and Ngamiland districts of Botswana for instance have g 
created employment opportunities for the local people. In these two districts employment has 
been provided by CTs and safari companies operating on communally owned land. CBOs in 
Botswana also reinvest the money generated from safari hunting through sub-leases in 
business ventures such as lodges and game camps (Mbaiwa, 2011). 
4.2.1 Cash Revenues and Game Meat Benefits 
In Botswana, individual cash revenue is distributed in the form of household dividends. Since 
the year 2005 to date income for households has been generated from joint venture 
partnerships. These house dividends are distributed after approval by the CTs at an annual 
general meeting. Individuals and Households in CHAs also receive benefits from the proceeds 
of safari hunting. For instance, meat from preferred wild animals such as impalas, buffalos 
and kudu are given to the local people residing within CHAs and the remainder of the meat is 
auctioned (Child et al. 2010). Meat from wild animals such as elephants, baboons and other 
animals that are less preferred is given to the local people especially the homeless and poor 
free of charge. Game meat is the most preferred household benefit from CBNRM by the local 
people in Botswana when compared to other benefits such as employment and house hold 
dividends. Thakadu (2005) also reported that the majority of the local people (52%) prefer 
game meat to other benefits in Botswana. 
4.2.2 Benefits to the Local Community 
In Botswana CBNRM projects have generated revenue from different sources and some of 
these include revenue from photographic tourism such as game drives, food and beverages 
and accommodation through lodges and game camps, land rentals, production of art crafts, 
walking safari, meat sales, donations and vehicles for hire. For instance, between the period 
2006 and 2010, the government of Botswana raised as much as P 70, 552,685 ($6,651,763) 
from various CBNRM activities respectively. Furthermore, P 35, 517, 534 ($3,348,621) was 
generated by CBOs from CBNRM projects between 2011 and 2012 (Mbaiwa, 2013). This is 
clear indication of success in CBNRM in Botswana as most of the CBOs generate huge sums 
of income. Just in Ngamiland district alone CBOs generate over 80% of the revenue from 
CBNRM and most of these CBOs were an unable to receive obtain this amount of income 
before the adoption CBNRM in Botswana (ibid). According to the USAID report (2009), 
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trophy hunting raises more revenue as compared to photographic tourism. For example 
between 2006 and 2009, it raised about P 33,041,127 ($3,115,143) compared to photographic 
tourism which only generated about P 4,399,900 ($414,826). 
4.2.3Provision social and financial Services  
Various surveys on CBNRM activities in Botswana have demonstrated that CBOs throughout 
the country contribute to the provision of social services in the local communities which 
include and these include the provision of micro finance loans schemes, housing for the 
homeless, scholarships and funeral assistance grants. For example CTs provide funeral 
assistance in form of cash amounting to P 3000 ($284) to members of the household who 
experience death of house member under the age of 16 years old (Mbaiwa, 2008). On the 
other hand, microfinance loans are given to the local community members through 
applications made to a local committee which reviews them and make recommendations to 
the Board of Trustees of a particular CT based on the viability of the submitted project 
proposal from the local community members. Additionally some of the income generated 
from joint venture partnership is given to the old people and physically and mentally 
challenged people in the local communities. However, the amounts of income given to the 
local communities differ from year to year based on the number of old people and physically 
and mentally challenged people in the community. These payments are received by members 
of the communities two times each year (Schuster, 2007; Johnson, 2009). 
Furthermore, the local communities in Botswana benefit from various assets that have been 
accumulated by CBOs from the effective implementation of CBNRM in their CHAs. For 
instance, many CBOs have purchased a number of vehicles with revenue raised from 
CBNRM projects and are used for various activities ranging from the collection of fire hood, 
transport and funerals. The members of the local community can also hire these vehicles to 
carry their goods. The availability of these vehicles has eased challenges relating to 
transportation for the local people and also increased the accessibility of remote areas to the 
big regional centers in the inner cities of the country. These vehicles have become a 
significant and reliable source of transport for many rural areas. They are used for business 
purposes such as carrying construction material and also for emergent medical services in the 
local communities. Income generated from CBNRM is also used to purchase equipment such 
as computers, phones, radios, television and internet in order to enable the local communities 
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to have access to information regarding what is happening in within the country and around 
the world (Mbaiwa, 2011). 
The introduction of modern computer technology, internet, television and radios in remote 
areas of Botswana is seen as a step in the right direction where information technology is 
concerned as it provides information to the local communities about the current affairs not 
only within Botswana but also around the globe. For instance, some CBOs in the Okavango 
Delta have even established offices to coordinate local community processes and also provide 
marketing services for their own tourism related businesses. These coordination centers have 
become significant social institutional arrangements through which the local communities in 
Botswana are able to express their sense of pride and also participate in mainstream tourism 
activities. These centers are also seen as means of engaging with customers and many other 
service providers (Mbaiwa, 2013).  
Additionally, before the adoption CBNRM in Botswana most rural communities had poor 
sanitation. But now most of the participating rural communities in CBNRM have proper water 
reticulation systems financed with income generated from CBNRM. In Botswana sanitation 
has been a major challenge and the government has been in most cases failed to meet the 
demands of the local people when it comes to the provision of safe water for drinking. 
Therefore, most of the rural communities in the country using income generated from 
CBNRM have drilled water bole holes, bought water pumping engines in a bid to ease the 
challenge of water shortage and sanitation. This has been a big score for CBOs in Botswana 
and should be seen a significant move towards meeting the demands of the local communities 
at the household level (Mbaiwa, 2012). 
4.2.4 Reinvestment and Regeneration of Income from CBNRM 
In Botswana, all the local communities involved in CBNRM invest in tourism development in 
their respective CHAs. The local communities have the rights to reinvest income realized 
from CBNRM activities into tourism business activities such as lodges, camps, food and 
beverages (DeGeorge and Reilly, 2008). According to Schuster (2007), CBNRM has changed 
some of the rural communities from areas of beggars who relied and lived on handouts from 
the central government and donor support into quite productive rural communities that are 
moving towards the attainment of more sustainable livelihood. The ploughing back of revenue 
from ecotourism business activities into good economic activities has become an important 
element of rural community development. In this regard CBNRM is seen as an important 
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instrument through which rural economic development is promoted in throughout the country 
(USAID, 2012). Therefore even though, the discussed social and economic benefits realized 
by individual household within the community are not a sufficient factor for explaining 
success in CBNRM, it can be seen that these benefits definitely important for changing the 
way the participating communities look at natural resources and the role this plays in 
enhancing their livelihood if it is managed in a sustainable manner (Arntzen, et al. 2007; 
Mbaiwa, 2012). 
4.2.5. Wildlife Management and Conservation in Botswana 
In Botswana, the adoption of CBNRM as a sustainable conservation strategy was driven by 
several factors which include the threat of extinction of wildlife species due to 
overexploitation as a result of increased poaching. This move to shift to CBNRM was also 
caused by the inefficiency of the state to protect wildlife resource base, increased land conflict 
among the local people living in resource rich areas and wildlife authorities (Mbaiwa, and 
Stronza, 2010). The realization of economic benefits from CBNRM and increased access to 
land by the local communities in Botswana has contributed the improvement in attitudes 
among the local towards wildlife conservation in CHAs (Arntzen, 2007). In Botswana 
wildlife conservation in CHAs where CBNRM is implemented is strengthen by the 
government through the imposition of specific requirements that are followed by all the CTs. 
For instance, CTs throughout the country are required embrace wildlife conservation goals in 
their CTs’ constitutions. In this regard, CTs formulate rules, regulations and pursue practices 
aimed at achieving conservation goals in their CHAs.  
Community escort guides are employed by CBOs through the country to monitor wild 
animals, their population and also check for the existence of rare of species. Furthermore, all 
CTs are expected to develop and produce management plans in which they are supposed to 
categorically state how natural resource management will be carried out in their respective 
CHAs (Mbaiwa, 2013). The government of Botswana also requires that all local communities 
through their CTs produce and present annual reports about how natural resource 
management was conducted in their respective CHAs every year. The CTs are supposed to 
present these reports before the DWNP produce their yearly wildlife quotas (Mbaiwa, 2011). 
In order to meet the requirements set by the government, many of the CTs have employed 
escort tour guides to ensure proper management of wildlife resources in CHAs. These tour 
guides have the responsibility to patrol CHAs and to also enforce agreed upon rules and 
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regulations on wildlife management and conservation. They also provide escort services safari 
operators and members of the local communities during hunting in CHAs (Mugabe et al. 
2005). Furthermore, even though the management of wildlife resources in Botswana remains 
the preserve of the central government, the local people are given significant access and user 
rights to wildlife resources through a well-defined quota system. In this regard, the local 
communities in Botswana are given some authority over wildlife resources after they are 
allocated a CHA by the District Land Board. Local communities in Botswana through their 
respective CTs are given the rights to sell their quotas to safari companies. Wild animals such 
as Impalas and Springbok are hunted by the local communities themselves to sustain their 
livelihood (Martin, 2009).  
The utilization of wildlife resources by CBOs especially in the Okavango and Chobe areas for 
the purpose of tourism through CBNRM has contributed to improved livelihood and enhanced 
the attitudes of the local communities towards wildlife conservation (Mbaiwa, 2010). This has 
been demonstrated by the desire and willingness of the local people to accept the hunting of 
wild animals through a quota system. Under a quota system the DWNP decides on the 
number of wild animals to be hunted by the local communities every year. The allocation of 
wildlife quotas based on the number of wildlife species in various CHAs helps to preserve 
wildlife and enhance its sustainability (Collins and Snel, 2008). 
In addition, even though there is not enough evidence regarding the impact of CBNRM on 
wildlife population, there are indications that the conservation of wildlife resources in areas 
where CBNRM has been implemented has improved. There has been a reduction in wildlife 
poaching, increased appreciation of the value of wildlife among the communities and 
improved relationships between the DWNP anti-poaching unit and other wildlife officers. 
There is however still not enough quantitative data available on wildlife in respective CHAs 
that can be used to demonstrate the impact of CBNRM on wildlife species and their 
population (Mbaiwa, 2013). A recent report by Chase (2012), reported that wildlife count in 
the Northern part Botswana has improved. The report also established 11 out of 14 wildlife 
species counted in Ngamiland District which included giraffe, wild beast, zebra and lechwe 
had reduced by 61% between 1996 and 2010 reflecting an average drop of 10% every year. 
This survey also established that the population of elephants in northern Botswana had 
remained stable at around 130000 heads. While other wildlife species such as Ostrich were 
increasing in number in Chobe National Park areas. 
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4.2.6 Management Oriented Monitoring Systems (MOMs) 
With respect to monitoring and keeping of balance of the wildlife resource base, the adoption 
and implementation of wildlife monitoring systems such the Management Oriented 
Monitoring System (MOMs) has been a key element in the development of CBNRM in 
Botswana. MOMs is a management system that is used in the collection of resource data 
which is valuable when it comes to monitoring wildlife resources in CHAs and other wildlife 
management areas. MOMs uses community participation instead of conventional scientific 
methods of monitoring which is usually costly as it requires advanced technological 
equipment and highly skilled expertise. In Botswana the Department of Wildlife and National 
Parks trains the local communities living in controlled hunting areas and teach them how to 
use MOMs in gathering data on game sightings, problem animals, rare species, dead and 
injured animals and village mapping (Mbaiwa, 2013). 
MOMs also include the use of event books and record cards for recording observation on wild 
animals. Different record cards are used to record wildlife sightings during patrols, rare and 
endangered species, problem animals, mortalities, game meat harvest, distribution and trophy 
hunting. The information recorded on these cards includes date of observations, species, 
geographical positioning system coordinates (GPS) of the location where the observation was 
made. They also show information regarding the number of wild animals and birds (Mandota, 
2011).The implementation of MOMs and the employment of tour guides by all CBOs is 
among the significant achievements of community based wildlife management and 
conservation in Botswana. For instance, an evaluation audit of 2012 conducted by the DWNP 
involving a total of 24 stations in CHAs, 10 problem animal control stations and 4 CBOs 
showed that the CBOs which had applied MOMs had maintained high standard records. The 
information gathered through MOMs is used by CBOs to provide guidance on how problem 
animals can be controlled. It is also used as supporting evidence when CBOs request for 
hunting quotas (Mbaiwa, 2013). 
Additionally, escort guides under the pay roll of CBOs play a significant role in CBNRM in 
Botswana. For example just in 2012 alone, a total of 14 CTs had employed a total number of 
111 escort guides. All these were employed for the purpose of combating wildlife poaching in 
CHAs and also ensuring compliance with the CBOs hunting regulations. They even escort 
hunters during hunting safaris and also monitor the activities of tourism companies such as 
photographic tourism and trophy hunting. They also record number of wild animals killed or 
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seen at a specific location in their CHAs. Additionally they are responsible also for 
apprehending poachers and handing them over to the law enforcement authorities such as the 
police. All these efforts clearly demonstrate the important role that the local communities 
have played in so far as wildlife management and conservation is concerned in Botswana 
(Mbaiwa, 2012). 
4.3.0 Historical Context of Wildlife Management and Conservation in 
Zambia 
4.3.1 Pre-Colonial Period 
Before the advent of western colonialism, the management and use of natural resources was 
based on a centralized traditional system. All natural resources were owned and controlled by 
traditional rules, norms and practices which were followed and strictly communicated through 
clans, families and traditional leadership. The communities formulated and enforced the rules 
and norms regarding wildlife use and preservation as a whole in order to promote strict 
compliance. As a result, these traditional systems, norms, practices and values sustained the 
use of natural resources and kept them balance (De George and Reily, 2008). Local traditional 
leaders also allocated various pieces of land for use by the local people for various purposes 
which included conservation. Nevertheless, British colonial government stripped off the 
indigenous communities of their rights and responsibilities over natural resources (Lewis et al. 
2008). 
4.3.2 Colonial Period 
During this period, the British colonial government established a centralized regime for 
natural resource management and conservation. Natural resource ownership and management 
rights were taken away from the traditional chiefs. All the powers and authority for natural 
resource management became centralized through the creation of protected resource 
management areas, game reserves and controlled hunting areas (Simasiku, et al. 2008). 
National parks and game reserves were established in designated wildlife resource rich areas. 
The local people were also displaced from their lands and lost ownership rights to natural 
resources (Brockington and Igoe, 2006). In 1925, the British colonial government enacted the 
first law called the Game Ordinance. This legislation provided for the establishment of the 
first game reserves in 1950, the Luangwa Game Reserve and the Kafue Game Reserve and 
many more that followed. Additionally, the British colonial government adopted the 
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ministerial policy which provided guidelines for the establishment of game reserves and 
utilization of wildlife resources. 
4.3.3 Post-Colonial Period 
When Zambia gained its independence from Britain in 1964, the post-colonial government 
decided to continue with the same colonial policies for natural resource management and 
conservation. Many policy amendments were made to provide for the control and regulations 
of areas designated as protected areas. In 1968, the National Parks and Wildlife Act No.57 
was adopted. This legislation gave powers to the Republican President to declare any area 
with a vast number of wildlife resources as a national park (Jackman, 2000). This Act also 
supported the establishment of two separate categories of protected areas namely the game 
management areas and national parks. These categories of protected areas were further 
supported by the adoption of legal instruments such as the Game Management Area 
Declaration Order of 1971,statutory instrument No.44 of 1972 and the National Parks 
Declaration Order of 1972. Following the adoption of these three legal documents all game 
reserves were transformed into national parks. The adoption and implementation of all these 
legislations entailed full nationalization of natural resource management and conservation. 
The local people were not recognized under these laws and were displaced from their lands 
and lost control over natural resources which they has previously collectively owned and 
controlled through the traditional natural resource governance regime (Siamundele, 2011). 
4.3.4 The Emergence of CBNRM in Zambia 
In Zambia, CBNRM originated within the wildlife sector and subsequently other sectors such 
as the fisheries, forest and agriculture followed through the adoption of the concept. During 
the colonial and post-colonial era, the responsibility to manage natural resources was taken 
away from the traditional authorities by both the colonial government and the post-colonial 
Zambian government (Mbewe et.al 2005; Molsa, 2009). For instance, in the fisheries and 
wildlife sector, where traditional leaders administered access-regulating mechanisms were 
largely replaced by a properly regulated natural resource governance regime introduced by the 
colonial government and this was extended after independence by the post-colonial 
government. This made community participation in natural resource management obsolete 
and non-existent. They also lost out as they stopped realizing economic benefits which 
accrued to them when natural resources were under their control and stewardship (Jackman, 
1998). This created a number of problems which ranged from increased wildlife poaching and 
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overexploitation exacerbated by inadequate logistical allocation and lack of enforcement of 
wildlife laws and regulations. All these problems provided an impetus for the rise of CBNRM 
as an alternative response to the fortress conservation model introduced by the British colonial 
state and largely contributed to the depletion of biodiversity in Zambia between the 1970s and 
1980s (Lewis et al. 1990). 
The first CBNRM Programme in Zambia started with the implementation of the 
Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas (ADMADE) in 1987.The 
foundation and emergence of CBNRM in Zambia can also be attributed to the Joint Lupande 
Research Project (1979-1984) which was initiated by the New York Zoological Society and 
the National Parks and Wildlife Services (NPWS). This project focused on the management 
of elephants and was conducted in an area largely occupied by the local people in the 
Lupande Game Management Area. The findings from this project highlighted the importance 
of community involvement in natural resource management. The local people were found to 
possess adequate and detailed knowledge of their tribal land, its flora and fauna and routes 
used by poachers to gain access to wildlife resources in their chiefdom (Mwape, 2003). 
Based on the success recorded in the 1987 in the Lupande Game Management Area, revenue 
sharing schemes were developed and extended to 8 additional GMAs in Zambia and later on 
ADMADE was implemented in 26 more GMAs (Hachileka, 1999). In new areas where 
ADMADE was implemented, revenue sharing from wildlife hunting provided a new hope for 
the local communities in terms of improved livelihood. Income generated from wildlife 
tourism and shared to the local communities was supposed to cover for resource management 
such recruitment of local community scouts and other management costs such as meetings. 
Rural development projected such building of clinics and schools were also going to be 
undertaken by the local people with the same revenue. The communities had also the 
authority to decide on which development project to undertake after the money was 
distributed to them (Child, 2009).  
The main objectives of ADMADE were to provide a self-sustained management Programme 
for long term protection of wildlife resources in GMAs and also develop an improved and 
sustainable basis for supporting local community development projects. It was also aimed at 
fostering a closer and more cooperative relationship between NPWS and the local 
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communities in wildlife management and conservation and also to earn foreign exchange 
from wildlife resource for the state treasury (Jones, 2007). 
4.3.5 Policy and Legislative Framework for CBNRM in Zambia 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the government of Zambia embarked extensive reforms of 
its environmental policies and laws. This has resulted in the development and adoption of new 
legislations and policies, in particular wildlife policy of 1998, the Zambia Wildlife Act of 
1998 and the national policy on the environment of 2007. 
4.3.6 The Wildlife Policy of 1998 
This policy was adopted in 1998 by the National Parks and Wildlife Services (NPWS) 
Department, under the Ministry of Tourism and Arts. This policy acknowledges the unique 
social, cultural and economic value that natural resources such as wildlife has and how such 
resources should be used and managed in a sustainable manner for the purpose promoting 
tourism and economic development in the country. It also provides general guidelines 
regarding how tourism related activities in national parks and protected game management 
areas should be carried out, including the conditions for the provision of tourism services and 
the fees to be charged on such services. This policy also recognizes the importance of 
community support and involvement in the management of wildlife resources throughout the 
country. It clearly states that in any planning process, the local communities should be given 
the chance to raise their concerns and ideas regarding how they think wildlife resources 
should be managed and conserved in national parks. In this regard community participation 
and support in the management of wildlife resources is done through community based 
organization known as Community Resource Boards (CRBs). The wildlife policy of 1998 
called for the creation of Integrated Resource Development Boards (IRDBs) now known as 
Community Resource Boards (CRBs) (GRZ, 1998). According to the guidelines of this 
policy, the local people living in areas adjacent to protected areas are encouraged to register 
their CBOs with the Zambia Wildlife Authorities (ZAWA) (Simasiku et al. 2008). 
The Wildlife Policy of 1998 further states that the management of all CBOs established to 
enhance the management and utilization wildlife in game parks and areas outside national 
parks should be done through democratically elected local community representatives. 
However, the day to day running of CBOs is done through the secretariat which is chaired by 
a traditional chief. This policy also stipulates that, Zambia Wildlife Authority should work 
with all the registered and help them develop strategies for community based wildlife 
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conservation. ZAWA is also required to assist in developing management plans for all 
registered CBOs through a participatory planning process that meets the local conditions of 
the participating communities (Child et al. 2010). 
Additionally, this policy requires that all CBOs hold their meetings in a democratic manner in 
which all decisions are reached through a consensus and meeting deliberations are recorded in 
form of minutes. ZAWA and other stakeholders such as NGOs are represented on these 
meetings and are expected to offer technical support aimed at ensuring that CBOs adopt 
informed decisions regarding the management, use and conservation of wildlife resources. 
The Wildlife Act of 1998 also employs this policy to facilitate and support community 
participation. However, this policy does not refer to access rights to resources and does not 
state how the benefits generated from wildlife conservation and utilization should be shared 
with the local communities living in open areas outside GMAs and national parks (Nyirenda, 
2010). 
4.3.7 The Zambia Wildlife Act of 1998 
The Zambia Wildlife Act of 1998 replaced the previous Wildlife Act of 1991. This Act 
created   ZAWA a regulatory state institution established to provide control and management 
of wildlife in game management areas and national parks. This institution was also created to 
promote and enhance the provision of benefits from GMAs to the local communities, protect 
and conserve wildlife resources and also support the implementation international wildlife 
treaties such as CITEs to which Zambia is signatory (ZAWA, 2009). 
This Act also makes it clear that the ownership of every wild animal in national parks, GMAs 
and outside areas in the country is vested in the republican president on behalf all the 
Zambians citizens. This Act also empowers ZAWA to exercise control over all wildlife 
resources and bird sanctuaries in national parks and GMAs. It further states that ZAWA 
should work in collaboration with the local communities and share with them the management 
responsibility of wildlife resources in GMAs. Additionally, this Act calls for the promotion of 
economic and social wellbeing of the local people in these areas. The Act further provides for 
control to entry and residence of any person in national parks and sets out regulations 
regarding the prevention of hunting in national parks without a hunting license or permit 
(GRZ, 1998). The director of ZAWA is responsible for issuing of hunting licenses of wild 
animals after sufficiently determining that the reasons for hunting certain animals are 
sufficiently justifiable. The Act also prohibits activities such as killing of or injuring of wild 
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animals, possession of banned weapons such as snares in national game parks (Mupeta, 
2012). 
4.3.8 The National Policy on the Environment (CBRNM Policy of 2007) 
The adoption of this policy in 2007 was a major milestone in the development of CBNRM in 
Zambia. The main objective of this policy is create an enabling environment for the 
management and conservation of wildlife resources  and other ecosystems in areas designated 
as protected areas in a way that promotes sustainable use, protection and reduction in human-
wildlife conflict (GRZ, 2007). This policy is informed by the principle that the local people in 
community should have equitable and fair access to benefits from tourism and conservation 
programmes and that income generated from sustainable use of wildlife resources should be 
fairly distributed to the participation local communities (DeGeorge and Reilly, 2009).  
4.4.0 Nature of Devolution in the Management of Wildlife Resources in Zambia 
In Zambia, the first community based wildlife management programme (ADMADE) had 
representation from the local community in the form of  Sub-Authority Committees 
(SACs).This was the most important political structure established for managing and 
determining the use of wildlife resources in GMAs. In the beginning a lot of power and 
authority rested in the hands of traditional chiefs. However, the local chiefs abused this 
authority over wildlife resources for their own selfish reasons instead of spearheading and 
facilitating community support and participation in the management and conservation of 
wildlife resources. Community participation was in this case hindered and sabotaged by the 
local level village committees under the control of traditional chiefs and close relations (DSI, 
2008). 
4.4.1 Organisation of Community Resources Boards 
In Zambia, traditional chiefs are still powerful and influential in the decision making process 
regarding the management of wildlife resources compared to Botswana (Nkanta and Breen, 
2010). For instance, wildlife in some GMAs at the district level is re managed by the 
traditional leaders. GMAs in Mumbwa district in central province of Zambia, has three sub-
authorities under the leadership of three local chiefs. There also about 6 of such structures in 
the Lupande GMAs. With the establishment of Community Resource Boards where they now 
regarded as chairmen rather executive members, traditional chiefs feel threatened and see this 
has deliberate move to strip them of their powers over land and wildlife resources (CRBSs) 
(Shackleton et al. 2010). 
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Currently, the participation of the local communities in the management of wildlife resources 
is done through locally established CBOs in Zambia. In Zambia all local communities 
intending to establish CBOs are expected to meet the requirements as stipulated in the wildlife 
Act of 1998. Firstly the local communities are required to express shared and common interest 
in wildlife resources in their respective areas under a defined chiefdom. The local 
communities are also expected to democratically elect their local representatives in CRBs. 
CRBs are also assisted by village representatives in the form of village action groups (VAG). 
Nevertheless, even with these newly established CBOs traditional chiefs still have power to 
nominate two representatives and these appointments are done through handpicking of close 
relations at the village level (Mupeta, 2012). 
4.4.2 Decision Making Over Wildlife Resources Management 
With respect to the management of wildlife resources in GMAs, state institutions in particular 
ZAWA, still retain most of the decision making authority and responsibility over wildlife 
resources. The local communities through their respective CRBs are only recipients of 
directives from ZAWA with regard to management plans for wildlife resources in GMAs. 
CRBs do not even have the authority to decide how revenue from wildlife tourism and 
conservation should be shared or redistributed to the local communities. Furthermore, wildlife 
quota setting, policing and licensing still remains the preserve of ZAWA. The local 
communities’ input in all this is still minimal as they are only required to give comments of 
approval. On paper the local communities residing in GMAs in Zambia share the 
responsibility to co-manage wildlife resources in GMAs with ZAWA but practically speaking 
do not possess formal decision making authority over the utilization and conservation of 
wildlife resources in their respective areas. This monopoly in decision making authority by 
ZAWA has rendered the role of community participation in wildlife management and 
preservation insignificant and non-existent (Anderson, and Mehta, 2013). 
The wildlife legislation of 1998 which makes provisions for the establishment of local 
institutional structures has also largely failed to enhance community participation in the 
management of wildlife. According to Jones and Erdman (2013), devolution of wildlife 
resource governance in Zambia to the local communities is still inadequate. The wildlife Act 
of 1998 does not clearly define the user rights for the local communities since ZAWA still 
retains the responsibility to design management activities and make final decisions regarding 
wildlife resource management. For instance, decisions regarding whether hunting by both 
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safari companies and the local people should be allowed to continue for a particular year and 
also the number of animals to be hunted in a particular year are still made by ZAWA.  
The wildlife Act of 1998 also only makes provisions for CRBs to have co-management 
responsibilities in GMAs and Open Access Areas (OAAs) but not in national parks. The 
CRBs do not also possess legal rights over natural resources other than wildlife such as land. 
There is also confusion with regard to the status of CRBs in legislations (DSI, 2008). CRBs 
are not corporate entities but instead a board of elected village representatives under the 
wildlife Act of 1998. As a consequence, CRBs cannot own land or enter into a partnership or 
joint ventures with private safari companies in their respective GMAs. CRBs cannot also own 
land and develop their own tourism infrastructure like the way it is with CTs in Botswana 
(Dixey, 2005). 
Additionally, almost all the ministers for tourism under successive governments for instance, 
have introduced a ban on local resident hunting and safari hunting and have in most cases 
interfered with the awarding of hunting licenses and tenders to private safari companies. For 
example in 2002, the minister of tourism under the Movement for Multiparty Democracy 
(MMD) government cancelled all the tenders given to safari companies by legally established 
committees, consisting of ZAWA, Zambia National Tender Board (ZNTB) and 
representatives from the local communities, traditional chiefs. He administratively awarded 
the tenders and concessions by himself instead. Similarly in 2012, when the Patriotic Front 
(PF) Party took over power, the newly appointed minister of tourism also took a unilateral 
decision and banned both local resident and safari hunting, activities from which the local 
communities are supposed to generate some benefits. Since then only the ban on safari 
hunting was lifted in 2014 while local resident hunting still remains effectively banned 
(Kilozizo and Kontinen, 2015). 
In Zambia, communal land is also still owned by the state. The Land Act of 1995 was adopted 
to ensure the security of land tenure for all land owners and provide for the preservation of 
traditional customary land for leaseholders. Nevertheless, this legislation has serious 
implications for landholders who cannot manage to go through the required formal procedure 
to obtain official documents to prove their ownership of land. As a consequence, the granting 
of rights over land and wildlife resources in Zambia still remain highly centralized and has 
largely been affected by political, bureaucratic control and manipulations leading to loss of 
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revenue and other associated benefits by the local communities. This situation has been 
worsened by undue influence and resistance coming from stakeholders with vested interests 
(Mupeta, 2012).  
Most of the local community interests are captured by the local elite in particular traditional 
chiefs and state officials and prayers from the private sector. The government has been 
reluctant in this case to completely devolve the power and authority despite having adopted 
several policies and legislations that makes provisions for co-management of wildlife 
resources. The rhetoric of community participation and empowerment in this case is not 
matched with the government’s political commitment to promote and facilitate the devolution 
of authority to manage wildlife resources to the local communities in residing in GMAs (DSI, 
2008). 
In light of the above challenges, the participation of local communities through their 
respective CRBs has recorded few positive effects. Firstly, it has at least provided a platform 
for local communities to have a little say in the management of natural resources and improve 
their livelihood. However, their performance has been less satisfactory as a result of 
mismanagement of revenue generated from wildlife tourism and conservation which is 
supposed to be redistributed to their respective local communities. The distribution of income 
generated from the utilization of wildlife resources through activities such as safari hunting 
and tourism concessions first goes to ZAWA before it can be redistributed to CRBs 
(Nyirenda, 2010). This income also takes time to reach actual local communities and the 
distribution process is not transparent. This has been worsened by lack of accountability and 
transparency in the administration of revenue and also by undue influence by the local 
traditional chiefs. This revenue sharing framework threatens the potential of CBNRM 
development and the management of wildlife resources in Zambia (Jones and Erdman, 2013). 
Furthermore, CRBs in Zambia also lack the capacity to their execute functions independently. 
No single CRB in Zambia has the power and authority to negotiate agreements with private 
tourism companies like it the case in other countries like Botswana. CRBs in Zambia heavily 
rely on ZAWA for technical support especially when it comes to drafting wildlife 
management plans for their respective GMAs. As a consequence, the capacity to run CRBs is 
systemically weak or non-existent in most GMAs in Zambia. Employment of qualified 
personnel to run and manage CRBs in Zambia is also a challenge because they do not have 
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sufficient sources of revenue to accommodate salaries (Simasiku et al. 2009). In addition, 
CRBs are also assisted financially by a few stakeholders and do not receive any allocations 
from the central government budget. Currently, revenue assistance for about 6 GMAs comes 
from DANIDA, NORAD and UNDP. 
4.4.3 Distribution of Benefits from Wildlife Utilization in Zambia 
The main source of revenue in community based wildlife management is income that is 
generated from animal and concession fees. Animal revenues come from fees collected 
through issuance of hunting licenses and this differs from animal to animal depending on their 
value. On the other hand concession fees constitutes income generated based on the value of a 
designated hunting area. These hunting areas are given to safari hunting companies with 
hunting licenses after signing a Tripartite Hunting Agreement (THA) with ZAWA and the 
CBRs. Afterwards these concession fees are paid by safari hunting companies on an annual 
basis for the time entire time period covered by the THA which usually ranges from 10 to 15 
years (Animal fees are shared as follows: 5% of the total revenue goes to chairmen of CRBs 
(Traditional chiefs); 45% goes to the CRBs in the form of community fund while the 
remaining 50% of the revenue is retained by ZAWA in the form of a wildlife conservation 
fund. On the other hand, concession fees are shared as follows; 5% goes to traditional chiefs 
as chairmen of CRBs, 15% is given to the CRBs in the form of a local community fund while 
80% of the revenue is retained by ZAWA in the form of a wildlife conservation fund 
(Nyirenda, 2010). 
4.4.4 Benefits to the community 
Furthermore,  45% of the little income received by the local community from animal fees and 
hunting concessions is allocated as follows; 45% is of this income goes wildlife resource 
management which includes escort services and resource protection; 35% of the revenue is 
allocated to rural community development projects such as the construction of feeder roads, 
community schools and water boreholes. While the remaining 20% of the revenue realized 
from wildlife resource utilization is allocated to carter for the administrative activities of 
CRBs (Mupeta, 2012).  
Since 2005 a total of 41 hunting concessions have been signed within GMAs and the local 
communities have benefited through employment as village scouts. These village scouts are 
employed by CRBs to help ZAWA with monitoring and protection of wildlife. These village 
scouts have the duty and responsibility to watch and monitor wildlife animals and also to 
47 
 
 
assess damage to crops caused by wild animals such as elephants. A total of 66 out of 72 
CRBs employed about 1012 village scouts between 2012 and 2013 in 33 out of 36 GMAs 
throughout the country (Jones and Erdman, 2013). In 2014 an addition of 79 support staff 
were employed by CRBs across the Country.The local communities have also received 
benefits in the form of social amenities from different rural development projects financed by 
income generated from wildlife utilization and tourism. These include water boreholes, 
clinics, feeder roads and measures aimed at reducing crop damage by wildlife such as chili 
pepper fences (Kilozizo and Kontinen, 2015). 
4.4.5 Benefits from Private Sector Partnerships 
In Zambia, the local communities benefit less from private sector engagement in the wildlife 
sector. For instance, the local community partnerships with the private safari companies have 
realized fewer benefits in terms of employment creation for the local communities. This has 
largely been due to the fact that local communities themselves do not possess the rights to 
negotiate and sign contracts with the private safari companies since they do not also have the 
rights to own land (Shackleton et al. 2010).  
In Zambia, safari companies directly work with ZAWA after they are awarded a tender by the 
Zambia National Tender Board (ZNTB). Only the traditional leaders are allowed to 
participate on the selection panel. The traditional authorities also maintain the authority over 
giving communally owned land to tourism or safari operating companies. However, these 
private safari operators are not under any obligations to share the money they make from 
trophy hunting and photographic tourism with the local communities except in circumstances 
where traditional chiefs are given some gifts as a token of appreciation for awarding them the 
land. As a consequence, the private sector has played a significant role in shifting the balance 
of power and control away from the local communities in wildlife management (Shackleton 
and Campbell, 2012).  
However, the local communities have always demanded for direct benefits from wildlife 
utilization such as the provision of fertilizers and household dividends but the state officials 
block this from happening. Benefit sharing   is also affected by the increasing population in 
the country. For instance, in most GMAs, the population of the people who expect to benefit 
from wildlife utilization is much bigger compared to the population of the actual communities 
affected by wildlife. As a result the benefits are diluted and have in most cases been 
outweighed by the costs incurred by individual households residing in GMAs. The local 
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people are not always compensated for property and crop damage caused by wild animals 
such as elephants. This has provided little incentives for Community based wildlife 
conservation and illegal wildlife hunting in GMAs in Zambia is still prevalent and on a high 
level (Mulobezi GMA Report, 2012). 
4.4.6 Wildlife Management and Conservation in Zambia 
Just like in the case of Botswana, there is no quantitative evidence demonstrating the impact 
of CBNRM on wildlife conservation in Zambia. Since 2008, more than half of wildlife 
populations in GMAs have declined to due to increased levels of wildlife poaching. In 
Zambia, this decline in wildlife resources has also been attributed to partial or lack of 
CBNRM implementation where user rights are not clearly defined and the expected benefits 
from wildlife utilization and conservation are not properly distributed and sometimes difficult 
to even get (Simasiku, et al. 2008). Jones and Erdman (2013), also reports that the natural 
environment available to provide support for wildlife in GMAs has shrunk throughout the 
country due to increased human habitation, claims to traditional land, uncoordinated wildlife 
planning by state departments and increased cultivation by the local people. 
Nevertheless, the population of some wild animals such elephants have shown signs of 
recovery in some GMAs especially those located in the Luangwa Valley in the eastern part of 
Zambia. The Luangwa Valley was initially the main focus of CBRNM in Zambia. Currently 
the Luangwa Game Management System hosts the majority of elephants in the country which 
now stands at 18,634. This figure constitutes 72% of the elephant population in Zambia. This 
is regarded as a significant increase in the population of elephants from the previously 
estimated 9000 in the early 1980s. However; these numbers should be interpreted with 
caution as there is no evidence that currently links this increase to the application of CBNRM 
in the Luangwa Valley. There could be other contributing factors such as disease and 
predation that might have an effect on the population of wildlife in GMAs but this is beyond 
the scope of this thesis (Sichilongo et al. 2013).  
Furthermore, different numbers of wildlife species are hunted and killed in GMAs through the 
use of what are known as special licenses. These licenses are discretionary given to private 
individuals and safari operators by the minister for the tourism sector. These special licenses 
minimize the potential earning and value of wild animals in protected areas. They also 
minimize conservation incentives by the local communities who are only allowed to kill and 
utilize wild animals for the purpose of cultural and traditional ceremonies. As a result wildlife 
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resources are subjected to high levels of poaching and non-resident hunting. Local 
communities themselves contribute further to illegal wildlife hunting using dangerous 
methods of killing such as snares and traps. This has been attributed to free riding mentality 
even when the benefits from CBNRM are evident the local people still have not refrained 
from poaching (CITE, 2010). Finally, wildlife monitoring and surveillance activities have not 
been fully developed due to lack of funding and investment in management systems. There is 
also lack of well-organized management systems such as MOMs to monitor the population of 
wildlife species (Becker et al. 2013). 
5. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
This section of the thesis provides a comparative analysis of CBNRM in both Botswana and 
Zambia to provide a concrete answer to the main research question of this study. This analysis 
is entirely based on wildlife policies and legislations adopted by the two countries and their 
actual application in the implementation of CBNRM. This study has demonstrated that even 
though Botswana and Zambia developed similar policies and legislations and understanding 
of the core foundations of CBNRM, the two countries have taken different trajectories in the 
development and implementation of CBNRM in the last 25 years. In this case, the differences 
in terms of the actual outcome in CBNRM in both Botswana and Zambia, have been 
explained from the point of view of political (institutional), economic and social and 
ecological context of the two countries. 
5.2 Local Community Participation 
To begin with the ownership and governance aspect of natural resources management has 
played a significant role in the flourishing of CBNRM in Botswana as compared to Zambia. 
In Botswana, the participation of the local communities in natural resource management is 
encouraged through legally established community based organizations (CBOs) known as 
Community Trusts (CTs). These CTs provide leadership to locally established and controlled 
institutions of CBNRM. CTs also provide coordination in tourism activities on behalf of their 
respective communities. The functioning of these CTs is guided by locally formulated 
constitutions which dictate on issues relating to membership, duties and responsibilities and 
the organization of each CT. The CTs in Botswana have been successful in managing wildlife 
resources in Botswana as a result of their entrenched legal and strong legal identity and 
democratic tenets (Mbaiwa, 2011). 
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Similarly, in Zambia the participation of the local communities in the Co-management of 
wildlife resources is exercised through locally established CBOs known as Community 
Resource Board (CRBs). In Zambia all local communities intending to establish CBOs are 
expected to meet the requirements as stipulated in the wildlife Act of 1998.Firstly the local 
communities are required to express shared and common interest in wildlife resources in their 
respective areas under a defined chiefdom (Anne and Daulos, 2014). The local communities 
are also expected democratically elect their local representatives in CRBs. Traditional 
authority is represented by a local chief. CRBs are also assisted by village representatives in 
the form of village action groups (VAGs). In Zambia, traditional chiefs play powerful and 
influential role in decision making regarding the management of wildlife resources compared 
to Botswana (Mupeta, 2012). 
5.3 Legal rights 
However unlike the CTs in Botswana, CRBs in Zambia are not corporate legal entities and do 
not also possess legal rights over natural resources such as wildlife and land. There is also 
confusion with regard to the status of CRBs in legislations (DSI, 2008). As a consequence 
CRBs cannot own land or enter into a partnership or joint ventures with private safari 
companies in their respective GMAs. CRBs cannot also own land and develop their own 
tourism infrastructure like the way it is with CTs in Botswana (Dixey, 2005). 
5.4 Organisation of CBOs 
In Botswana devolution and effective governance of natural resource has been realized 
through the establishment of effective local institutional arrangements called Community 
Trusts. CBOs also allow the local communities they represent participate and realize benefits 
from tourism activities in their own areas. CTs also provide local leadership and decide on 
how land and wildlife resources should be used in their designated Chas. The decentralization 
of rights and custodianship of wildlife resources to the participating communities has been 
achieved through the development of effective policies and legislations and a quota system 
that allows the communities to obtain exclusive rights over land and rights to sublease their 
land to private safari companies. Through collective actions, the local people in Botswana 
have established these local institutions in order to ensure community participation in the 
management of wildlife resources and tourism development. In Zambia this has not been as 
wildlife quota setting, policing and licensing still remains the preserve of ZAWA. On paper 
the local communities residing in GMAs in Zambia are supposed to share the responsibility to 
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co-manage wildlife resources in GMAs with ZAWA but in practice do not possess formal 
decision making authority over the utilization and conservation of wildlife resources in their 
respective areas.  
5.5 Decision Making Over Wildlife Resources 
Co-management in the management of natural resources particularly wildlife has not been 
achieved in Zambia. This is largely due the fact that state institutions such as ZAWA still 
retain most of the decision making authority and responsibility over wildlife resources. The 
local communities through their respective CRBs are only recipients of directives from 
ZAWA with regard to management plans for wildlife resources in GMAs. CRBs do not even 
have the authority to decide how revenue from wildlife tourism and conservation should be 
shared or redistributed to the local communities. This monopoly in decision making authority 
by ZAWA has rendered the role of community participation in wildlife management and 
preservation insignificant and non-existent (Anderson and Mehta, 2013). The monopoly in 
decision making by the state regulatory institution in Zambia largely explains why Zambia 
has relatively performed badly than Botswana CBNRM in the last 25 years. The finding of 
this study all point to decentralization as the major determinant factor in the successful 
implementation of CBRNM. The findings of this study also coincides with previous research 
findings in other countries where devolution of decision making powers and responsibility 
over natural resources from the state to locally established institution was found to predict 
success and where lack of it leads to failure in CBNRM (Rozemeijer, 2003; Salam, et al. 
2006; Bawa, 2007). 
5.6 Collective Ownership of Natural Resources 
In terms of ownership of natural resources in Botswana, the government owns all the natural 
resources just like it is in Zambia. But the only difference that exists is that in Botswana, the 
local communities still have the chance to obtain wildlife quotas in their respective CHAs 
given to them through various legislative and policy guidelines (Mbaiwa, 2011). In Botswana, 
the local communities are also given rights to sell their hunting quotas and sub-lease the land 
they acquire to safari operators. Through these leases the local communities are given 
management authority and user rights in their designated CHAs during the stipulated time 
period (Collomb et al. 2010). 
In Botswana, the local communities also have the rights to enter into partnership with local 
safari companies in the ownership and management of tourism which is not the case in 
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Zambia. The most striking reason for failure of CBNRM in GMAs in Zambia lies in the 
failure of wildlife legislation and policies to recognize the significance of the granting the 
local communities the rights to land and wildlife resources. The wildlife Act of 1998 does not 
clearly define the user rights for the local communities since ZAWA still retains the 
responsibility to design management activities and make final decisions regarding wildlife 
resource management. The case is different with Botswana where the local communities are 
given exclusive rights to extract and utilize natural resources on communal land as long as 
they possess a permit or license to do so. In Botswana the local communities have access and 
commercialization rights over wildlife resources and other natural resources through the lease 
agreement arrangements (Anderson and Mehta, 2013). 
5.7 Distribution of Benefits  
With regard decisions over the distribution of income and other benefits CBOs in Botswana 
previously retained all the revenue realized from wildlife tourism and made all the decisions 
regarding the distribution and use of it. However, the CBNRM policy of 2007 reversed this as 
it requires CBOs to return 65% of all the revenue generated from wildlife tourism to a 
national trust fund. All the revenue deposited in this trust fund is used to support other CBOs 
through the country but the CTs are allowed to apply back for it. In Zambia on the other hand, 
ZAWA retains all the decision making authority over the distribution of income generated 
from wildlife utilization. In Botswana benefits realized from CBNRM can be put into three 
main categories and these include individual benefits, community benefits and national 
Benefits (Arntzen, 2007). In Botswana, the local communities have benefited from CBNRM 
through a number of ways which range from employment creation, house hold dividends such 
as cash and game meat benefits, social services and infrastructural development. However, 
employment is one of the key benefits that the participating local communities receive from 
CBNRM projects.  
Additionally, in Botswana the local communities also generate a lot of revenue from different 
sources which include revenue from photographic tourism such as game drives, food and 
beverages and accommodation through lodges and game camps, land rentals, production of 
art crafts, walking safari, meat sales, donations and vehicles for hire. The findings of this 
study coincide with the finding of the study in Ghana, where community participation and 
equal distribution of benefits and local community empowerment were identified as some of 
the factors that defined the success of the CBNRM Programme (Sheppard et.al, 2010). 
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Contrastingly, in Zambia state institutions ZAWA depend so much on revenue generated from 
wildlife resource utilization. Almost 45-67% of their income comes from trophy hunting from 
various GMAs (Manning, 2011; Sichilongo et al. 2013). This heavy dependence on revenue 
from trophy hunting results in conflict of interest, because the state regulatory institution is 
also a direct beneficiary of revenue generated from wildlife utilization in GMAs. As a 
consequence, the local communities tend to get less management rights and less revenue. 
National legislations and policies have not also created an enabling environment for the local 
communities to conduct or enter into business partnerships directly with the private tourism 
companies and retain revenue for themselves (Jones, 2007). Transfer of decision making 
authority over the distribution of revenue from wildlife utilization is a critical success factor 
for CBRNM. Hence, uneven distribution or non-distribution of agreed upon sharing powers 
and revenue to the local communities in Zambia shows the persistent dominance of the state 
in the revenue redistribution process. This has resulted in the exclusion and partial integration 
of the local people living in GMAs in the distribution of benefits from wildlife management 
and utilization (Nkata and Breen, 2010). This possess a huge challenge for community 
participation in CBNRM since ZAWA collects all the revenue and reserves the huge chunk of 
it while the community wait for a long period of time to get their small share of the revenue. 
In Zambia the local communities also benefit less from private sector engagement in the 
wildlife tourism when compared the benefits the local communities in Botswana realize from 
private business partnerships with safari operators in their respective CHAs. For instance, the 
local community partnerships with the private safari companies have realized fewer benefits 
in terms of employment creation for the local communities. This has largely been due to the 
fact that local communities themselves do not possess the rights to negotiate and sign 
contracts with the private safari companies since they do not also have the rights to own land 
(Shackleton et al. 2010). This study thus demonstrates importance of equal distribution of 
benefits as one of the complimentary factors determining the success of CBNRM. Of course 
for benefits from CBNRM to be distributed in a fair manner the local communities need to get 
involved in deciding the benefits generated from CBNRM are to be allocated (Ipara et al. 
2005). This is often works out in situation where the state gives some of its authority and 
responsibilities for managing wildlife to the local communities as it has been seen in the case 
of Botswana.  
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In Botswana the local communities through their respective CTs are able to sub-lease their 
land and sell their hunting quotas to private safari companies at fee which is paid directly to 
CTs. The local communities are also able to sign contracts and enter into partnership with 
private safari operators as shareholders and by so doing they have a stake in whatever amount 
of income is generated from tourism activities such as trophy hunting and photographic 
tourism is shared with the community. However, in Zambia safari companies work directly 
with ZAWA when it comes to obtaining hunting licenses and signing land concessions. In this 
case, private safari operators are not obliged to share the money they make from trophy 
hunting and photographic tourism with the local communities except in circumstances where 
traditional chiefs are given gifts for awarding them the land. This situation has been largely 
worsened by the communities’ lack of ownership over land and the rights to negotiate and 
sign contracts with the private safari companies (Shackleton et al. 2010). This study therefore, 
builds on previous research findings which have highlighted the importance of understanding 
the role of the state, communities, private sector and non-state actors like NGOs if we are to 
understand and explain the factors that determine the success and failure of CBNRM (Tsing, 
2005; Bleike, 2006). 
In the case of Zambia, private safari companies have played a critical role in changing the 
balance of power and control away from the local communities in wildlife management. As a 
result the incentives for wildlife conservation in Zambia are very weak and poorly designed 
when compared to Botswana. In Botswana, the local communities through their CTs have the 
power and authority to determine hunting quotas in their designated CHAs to private Safari 
companies at a fee. Thus the failure in CBRNRM in Zambia can largely be attributed to the 
failure of by the government to develop an adequate and clearly defined legal, institutional 
and policy to fully devolve decision making authority and responsibilities to manage wildlife 
to the local communities. Lack of devolution of decision making authority and responsibility 
to manage wildlife to the local community makes it difficult for them to effectively participate 
in wildlife management and conservation (Shackleton and Campbell, 2012).  
The finding of from this study have also shown that lack of decentralization in wildlife 
resource management in Zambia is associated with challenges related to governance issues 
such as corruption and lack of political will on the part of the government to relinquish the 
power and authority over wildlife to the local communities who live within the parameters of 
protected areas. This point has also been highlighted in the existing literature as one of the 
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major cause for failure in CBNRM (Anstey et al. 2002). On the other hand, success of 
CBNRM in Botswana can largely explained from the point of view of effective governance of 
natural resources through devolution which grants the local communities ownership over land 
and wildlife resources in CHAs. In this regard, wildlife resources given to CBOs in Botswana 
through established quota system practically and automatically entails that it belongs to them.   
This study therefore, demonstrates the importance of decentralization in natural resource 
management and supports the argument by scholars such as Boggs (2000), who has argued 
that the management and conservation of natural resources through a top-down approach 
using state institutions, has been inefficient and ineffective in natural resources conservation 
in the past. 
5.8 Wildlife Management and Conservation 
To effectively achieve conservation goals, the government of Botswana through the state 
regulatory body DWNPs works in collaboration with the local communities involved in 
CBNRM. In this case, wildlife conservation in CHAs where CBNRM is implemented has 
been strengthened through the imposition of specific requirements on all the CTs. The 
DWNPs requires for instance, CTs throughout the country to adopt wildlife conservation 
goals in their respective constitutions. On the other hand in order to ensure that all CTs 
involved in CBNRM are accountable and transparent, the government of Botswana requires 
that all local communities through their CTs produce and present annual reports about how 
natural resource management was conducted in their respective CHAs every year. On the 
hand in Zambia, there is little collaboration between the state authorities and the local 
communities. The participating local communities in have little say on wildlife management 
and conservation plans. They have merely been reduced to recipients of directives from 
ZAWA. 
The case of Botswana also demonstrates that the success of CBNRM is also partly dependent 
on the enhanced capacity of the local people. This has been achieved through the adoption of 
monitoring orientation management systems. In Botswana the Department Wild and National 
Parks conducts training for the local communities in CHAs and teach them how to use MOMs 
in gathering valuable information on game sightings, problem animals, rare species, dead and 
injured animals and village mapping. Local capacity in Botswana has also been enhanced 
through the employment of escort guide. These escort guides have proved to be effective in 
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regulating hunting through increased patrols of controlled hunting areas in Botswana 
(Mbaiwa, 2013).  
MOMs in Botswana has proved to be an effective tool for monitoring and maintaining the 
balance of the wildlife resource base. This is not however the case with Zambia, where 
government through ZAWA which is state regulatory body claims monopoly over the 
management and control of wildlife resources throughout the country. With regard to resource 
monitoring, wildlife monitoring and surveillance activities have not been fully developed in 
GMAs. This is largely due to lack of funding and investment in well-organized management 
systems such as MOMs to monitor the population of wildlife species (Becker et al. 2013). The 
local communities also do not have enough income to employ a sufficient number of escort 
guides. The existing number of escort guides employed by CRBs in Zambia is insignificant 
when compared to the number of local people under the pay roll of CTs in Botswana. This 
study therefore builds on literature arguing that enhanced capacity of the local communities is 
effective  in monitoring and maintaining the balance of natural resources and enforcement of 
rules, regulations and agreed upon sanction by the community regarding the management, 
utilization and conservation of natural resources within their vicinity (Du Toit, 2002; Trans, 
2006; Holmern, et al. 2007). 
Regarding the exact impact of CBRNRM on conservation, this study did not find any 
quantitative evidence demonstrating the impact of CBNRM on wildlife population in both 
Botswana and Zambia. However in Botswana, there is indication that the conservation of 
wildlife resources in the northern part of the country where CBNRM has been implemented 
has improved. There has been a reduction in wildlife poaching, increased appreciation of the 
value of wildlife among the communities and improved relationships between the DWNP 
anti-poaching unit and other wildlife officers. On the other hand in Zambia since 2008, more 
than half of wildlife populations in GMAs have declined to due to increased levels of wildlife 
poaching. The natural habitat which provides support for wildlife in GMAs in Zambia has 
also shrunk throughout the country due to increased human habitation, increased claims to 
traditional land, uncoordinated wildlife planning by state department (ZAWA) and increased 
cultivation by the local people. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
This study was set out to understand why some African countries succeed in implementing 
co-management programmes in natural resource management while others fail to do so. To 
understand and answer this question the impact and success of CBNRM was measured along 
four main aspects which included ownership (tenure rights and responsibilities), 
empowerment (devolution), and governance (organisation of CBOs at the local community 
level) distribution of economic and social benefits and conservation of wildlife resources. On 
one had this study has demonstrated the successful case of CBNRM in Botswana. The 
government of Botswana has walked the talk in its quest to promote CBNRM throughout the 
country. The study has shown that the success of CBNRM in Botswana has been realized 
through effective cooperative efforts by the government and the local communities residing in 
CHAs. The case of Botswana proves the fact that when the local people are given appropriate 
incentives, authority and ownership over land and wildlife resources, they could effectively 
organize themselves in managing and preserving wildlife resources. On the other hand, this 
study has demonstrated why Zambia has been less successful than Botswana in co-
management programmes despite having initiated CBNRM at the same time and adopted 
similar policies and legislation. CBNRM has been less successful in Zambia as compared to 
Botswana because there is lack of political will to decentralize decision making authority and 
responsibilities over wildlife management to the local communities. Additionally, less 
attention has been paid to the development of effective local institutions and formulation of 
legislations and policies to support local community ownership of natural resources. In the 
case of Zambia, many problems need to be resolved regarding CBRNM to ensure its success 
in terms of achieving rural development and conservation goals. Firstly, inconsistencies and 
lack of clarity in policies and legislations supporting CBNRM should be addressed. Security 
of tenure rights and responsibilities over land and natural resources need to be ensured. The 
implementation of CBNRM in Zambia has entirely not been based of the core foundations of 
CBNRM. The state still retains exclusive centralized control over existing wildlife resources 
throughout the country. Challenges relating the provision of appropriate incentives and 
distribution of benefits from CBNRM need to be also addressed. This could be done through 
the development of a fair and equitable benefit sharing framework embedded in law and 
policy. Last but not the least; future research should also attempt to explore more about the 
local communities’ attitudes towards CBNRM in different contexts. 
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APPENDIX: I 
SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
 
Country 
Cases 
Local Ownership Community Participation/Organisation 
of CBOs 
Social and Economic Benefits Wildlife Conservation 
 
 
BOTSWANA 
 Local communities are 
granted ownership rights 
over land and wildlife 
resources through quota 
system and 15 year lease 
 Local communities have 
the rights to sub-lease or 
sell their quotas to private 
safari companies 
 Local communities can 
enter into private business 
partnership and sign 
contracts with private safari 
companies 
 Local communities have 
the rights to establish game 
ranches in CHAs 
 Community Participation is 
encouraged the establishment of 
Local institutions Known as 
Community Trusts 
 Everyone above the age of 18 is 
an automatic member of the CTs 
 CTs are corporate and legally 
established entities 
 CTs are run by the Board of 
Trustees democratically elected 
by the members of the community 
themselves 
 Functioning of CTs is guided by a 
locally formulated constitution 
 Traditional authority in CTs is 
represented by local chiefs who 
are ex/officio members of the 
Board of Trustees 
 Policies and legislations 
support equitable and fair 
distribution of direct and 
indirect from trophy hunting 
and photographic tourism 
 Local communities retain 
35% of all revenue raised 
from CBNRM and 65 % is 
put in a national fund but 
CBOs throughout the 
country can reapply for these 
funds 
 Local communities also 
benefit through jobs that are 
created by CTs (e.g. game 
escort guides) 
 Local communities benefit 
from social amenities and 
infrastructure such as clinics, 
water reticulation systems, 
micro finance loans, funeral 
grants, bush meat 
 Local communities benefit 
also from the provision of 
transport services, 
 Wildlife populations 
have stabilized in areas 
where CBNRM has 
been implemented 
though there is currently 
lack of enough 
quantitative evidence in 
this aspect of 
conservation 
 Poaching levels are also 
low in CHAs as CTs 
have employed escort 
game guides to patrol 
CHAs to combat illegal 
hunting of wildlife. 
 Escort guides also 
accompany local 
resident hunters and 
safari hunters on 
hunting tours 
 Hunting of animal by 
local people and 
external resource users 
with hunting licenses 
(Hunting quota) 
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computers, TVs, Internet 
service and better road 
networks 
 Local communities also 
reinvest the generated into 
business activities such as 
lodges, game camps, food 
and beverages 
 Financial assistance is also 
provided to the old people, 
destitute and physically 
challenged 
 The local communities 
are also able to monitor 
and observe and keep 
records of wild animals 
on specific locations 
using MOMs 
 All land owners are also 
required to keep records 
of all killed animals and 
submit these records to 
the licensing state 
authorities 
 
ZAMBIA 
 Wildlife policies and 
legislations do not support 
the devolution user and 
tenure rights to natural 
resources such as land and 
wildlife to the local 
communities 
 Ownership of land and 
wildlife in national parks, 
GMAs and Open Access 
Areas is still vested in the 
Republican President on 
behalf of Zambian citizens 
 ZAWA still retains most of 
the decision making powers 
and authority over wildlife 
management and 
conservation 
 ZAWA decides how and 
when hunting should be 
conducted 
 Local communities are 
encouraged to participate in 
wildlife management through the 
establishment of CBOs known as 
Community Resource Boards 
(CRBs) which are registered with 
ZAWA 
 CBRs are not autonomous legal 
or corporate entities but are 
simply a board of elected village 
representatives elected by the 
participating local communities 
and as result cannot own land or 
enter into private business 
activities on their own or with 
private safari operators 
 Day to day running of CRBs is 
done through a Secretariat chaired 
by a local traditional chiefs 
 The local communities only 
retain 45% of the income 
generated from wildlife 
tourism 
 From concession fees the 
local communities only 
receive 15% of the income 
while 5% goes to the 
traditional chief and ZAWA 
retains 80% of the revenue 
 Local communities have 
benefited less in terms of 
employment creation as 
CRBs do not have sufficient 
sources of revenue to 
accommodate salaries 
 Only a small number of 
village scouts are employed 
by CRBs to help ZAWA 
with resource monitoring and 
protection 
 ZAWA develops 
management and 
conservation strategies 
for CRBs through a 
participatory process 
 There no enough 
quantitative evidence 
demonstrating the 
impact of CBNRM on 
wildlife populations 
 The levels of poaching 
are still high 
 Natural habitat has also 
shrunk due to increased 
human settle, claims to 
customary land, 
increased cultivation by 
the local people and 
uncoordinated wildlife 
planning 
 Only in GMAs Located 
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 ZAWA retains exclusive 
authority over the 
redistribution of income 
generated from wildlife 
tourism 
 Quota setting, policing and 
licensing still remains the 
preserve of ZAWA 
 The local communities do 
not practically possess any 
formal authority regarding 
utilization and conservation 
of wildlife in their 
respective GMAs 
 Communities benefit from 
social amenities provided 
through the implementation 
of various rural development 
projects financed by their 
45% share of revenue( 
clinics, water bole holes, 
feeder roads and reduced 
crop damage through the 
creation chili pepper fences 
 Local communities do not 
benefit from the private 
sector in as they cannot 
negotiate contracts or enter 
into joint ventures with 
private safari operators. 
 Safari operators deal directly 
with ZAWA and are not 
under any obligations to 
share their profits with the 
local communities 
 
in the Luangwa Valley 
where the firs CBRNM 
was initiated has 
recorded positive results 
in terms on increased 
and stabilized elephant 
population 
 There is still lack of 
effective wildlife 
management and 
monitoring systems 
such as MOMs due to 
low levels of funding  
73 
 
 
 
